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When Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alto jouied the United States Supieme Court
most commentators predicted it would become mom conservative. Indeed many believed that
the rhnvigorated federalism revolution under Chief Justice Rehnquist would if anything,
become more robust under the new chief To a large degree, those commentators were ight; the
Court has decided numerous hotly contested fedealism cases along predictable ideological
lines But there are some important counterexamples in the Courth federalism junsprudence
In a list of cases about access to plaintiff-friendly state courts, the Justices seem to abandon their
federalism pincples Instead the liberal wing of the Court generally votes in favor of robust
states' nghts, while the conservative wing votes to inpose defendant-friendly federal rules in
civ litigation or to require plainatiffs toproceedin relatively hostile federal courts.
This Article is the list to focus on the Roberts Courth treatment of federalism h civil
procedure cases and the consequences for private civil litigation. It argues that the apparent
disconnect between individual Justices' stances in procedural cases and their federalsm
commitments is due, at least in part, to the Justices' understandngs of the puiposes for and
effectiveness of the federal civil litigation system. By examinig the Justices'nanatives about
civil lingation, the Article demonstrates that even as they invoke the language offederaism, the
Justices'positions in procedural cases correlate with the ciw litigation intersts they seek to
protect: business interests for the conservative Justices and access to justice for the liberal
Justices. This Article concludes that these interests, and not federalism commitments, are far
better predictors ofhow the Justices will decide procedural cases. Yet, the Article argues, the
Court should more closely adhere to traditional conservative federalism priciples in this
context Procedumljurisprudence that is deferential to states inprivate civil litigation is likely to
create greater access to the courts and thus a more just civi litigation system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito joined
the United States Supreme Court, most commentators predicted that
308 [Vol. 89:307
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the Court would become more conservative.' Indeed, many believed
that the reinvigorated federalism revolution under Chief Justice
William Rehnquist would, if anything, become more robust under the
new chief.2 To a large degree, those commentators were right. In a
number of contested substantive cases, the conservative wing of the
Court has favored states' rights, while the liberal wing has taken the
opposite position.' The standard story is that conservatives believe that
limitations on federal power should be substantial and deference to
state sovereignty the norm, while liberals believe that the federal
government should have meaningful power and that state sovereignty
should yield to that power where appropriate.' In the context of
substantive legal developments, conservative and liberal Justices tend
to, but do not always, divide this way.'
I . See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Dnfi Among Supreme Court Justices:
Who, When, and1owlmportant?, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1483, 1536 (2007) ("[W]hile both new
Justices [Roberts and Alito], not unexpectedly, have emerged as conservatives .. ., our results
here suggest that ideological drift is not only possible but likely."); Maxwell L. Steams,
Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv 875, 878 (2008) ("Commentators generally agree that on the nine-Justice Supreme
Court, the two appointments [of Justices Roberts and Alito] have produced a single-increment
move, ideologically, to the right."); Dave Gilson, Charts: The Supreme CourtS Rightward
Shit, MOTHER JONES (June 26, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/
06/supreme-court-roberts-obamacare-charts ("By several measures, the court headed by
Chief Justice John Roberts is the most conservative since the early 1970s . . . .").
2. See, e.g, Jeff Bleich, Michelle Friedland & Daniel Powell, The New Chief OR.
ST. B. BULL., Nov. 2005, at 18, 23 (noting that Justice Roberts' previous jurisprudence
"suggests a willingness to closely scrutinize acts of Congress to ensure they are a proper
exercise of the Commerce power, an inquiry that many of the more liberal justices feel is
usually unnecessary").
3. See discussion nfm Part II.A. It is true that the labels "conservative" and
"liberal" oversimplify the Justices' ideological positions. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1431, 1433
(2013) ("[T]here is no uniform conservative or uniform liberal ideology. Instead there are
multiple imperfectly overlapping ideologies.... Such differences can make it difficult or
even impossible to distinguish between 'liberal' and 'conservative' Justices."). As this Article
notes, decisions do not always split on an even "conservative" and "liberal" plane. For ease
of discussion, however, this Article will refer to the Court's popularly perceived factions in
this way.
4. This is an oversimplification of federalism as an ideology, but as this Article will
discuss, the purpose is not to critique or expound on federalism, but to observe and explain
inconsistencies in the Justices' federalism decisions. See discussion infia Parts III-V
5. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Courth Two Federalisms, 83 TEx. L. REV 1, 3
(2004) ("There is, of course, the obvious pattern: Five Justices are generally for imposing
constitutional limits on federal authority in a number of different contexts, while four have
consistently opposed such limits."). There are exceptions in the substantive context, which
will be discussed in Part II.A. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative"Paths of
the Rehmquist Courth Fedealism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. Rev 429, 468-69 (2002) (arguing
that the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions reflect a "mixed picture" of the Justices'
ideologies and motivations).
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However, this Article reveals that in the procedural law context,
the Justices regularly abandon their espoused federalism principles.'
This is particularly so in hotly contested cases.' They desert these
principles, in part, because they want to protect the parties they believe
are most at risk in private civil litigation-businesses or plaintiffs.'
Thus, this Article shows that in procedural cases, conservative Justices
tend to protect corporate defendants at the expense of their federalism
principles;' liberal Justices tend to do the opposite." The Justices'
respective opinions in these cases reveal why this is. Conservative
Justices are skeptical of the civil justice system, and they are especially
concerned that state law and state courts can imperil business interests
through, for example, coerced settlements and protracted and costly
discovery." Conversely, liberal Justices manifest concern for
individual or small-business plaintiffs and their access to the civil
litigation system. 2 Accordingly, they seek to increase access to
relatively plaintiff-friendly state courts. What all this means is that
6. See discussion inlia Parts III-V
7. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Are Even Unanimous
Decisions in the United States Supreme Court Ideological?, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. 699, 702
(2012) ("[W]hen the ideological stakes are small, a combination of dissent aversion with
legalistic commitments is likely to override the ideological preferences of the Justices.");
Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1445 ("We do not expect a Justice's ideological
preferences to influence his vote in cases in which there are no ideological stakes."). There
are exceptions, of course. See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013)
(unanimously holding that Monsanto can patent its genetically modified soybean); Adam
Liptak, Justices Agree To Agree, at Least for the Moment, N.Y TIMES (May 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/supreme-court-issuing-more-unanimous-rulings.html?
r-0.
8. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 1473 ("We find that after the
appointment of Roberts and Alito, the other three conservative Justices on the Court became
more favorable to business . . . ."); Jeffrey Rosen, Keynote Address, Big Business and the
Roberts Court, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 929, 929 (2009) ("[Tlhe Roberts Court, broadly
speaking, does have a generally pro-business orientation . . . ."); Adam Liptak, Corporations
Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/20
13/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-court.html?pagewanted=
all (discussing Epstein, Landes, and Posner, supra note 7); Tony Mauro, Just How Business-
Fiendly Is the Supreme Court, Anyhow?, NAT'L L.J. (ONLINE) (July 24, 2013), Lexis.com
(select the "Find A Source" tab; type "The National Law Journal" into the search bar, select
"Find" to run the search, and then select that journal from the list; type "Just How Business-
Friendly Is the Supreme Court, Anyhow?" into the Natural Language search box and select
"Search") (discussing the debate over whether the Court is pro-business); see also discussion
infra Parts III-V But see Richard A. Epstein, The Myth ofa Pro-Business SCOTUS, HOOVER
INSTITUTION (July 9, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/research/myth-pro-business-scotus
(challenging the allegation that the Court is pro-business).
9. See sources cited supra note 8.
10. See discussion fria Parts HI-V
11. See discussion fafm Parts IVA, VA.
12. See discussion infm Parts III.B, IVB, VB.
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when a procedural case includes a federalism issue, the Justices are
much less likely to take their traditional federalism positions and are
much more likely to make decisions protective of these interests.
This Article is the first to focus on the Roberts Court's treatment
of federalism in procedural law and what it means in the context of
private civil litigation.13 It argues that the Justices consistently abandon
their traditional federalism principles in procedural cases. Yet, the
Article argues, the Court's guiding federalism values in this context
should be more traditionally conservative. States have a critical
interest in protecting their citizenry. Thus, states' laws and courts are
owed some amount of deference when their citizens engage in private
disputes.
Part II of this Article briefly discusses federalism in the
substantive context, how federalism issues arise in procedural cases,
and the methodology this Article used to determine which procedural
cases to review. Parts III, IV, and V discuss procedural cases where
federalism is at play, demonstrating that in almost every one of these
decisions, most of the conservative Justices take a position that favors
the federal government, while most of the liberal Justices take a
position favoring the states.
Parts III through V also contextualize the Justices' federalist
diversions by discussing them alongside contentious narratives about
the private civil litigation system. Part III examines the Justices'
13. See genemlly A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE
L. REv 233 (2007) (reviewing "anti-federalist" conduct by both Congress and the Rehnquist
Court and suggesting reforms that would better honor constitutional federalism principles).
Spencer's work reveals some procedural areas where the Court has not adhered to substantive
federalism principles. Id. at 238-40, 247-64. However, his article centers on a discussion and
critique of how those decisions are not consistent with broader constitutional principles. Id
at 264-81. It does not examine how the pro-federalism and anti-federalism wings of the
Court take different ideological stances in private civil litigation cases. In addition, one other
scholar has addressed this issue with respect to the Eie Doctrine under the Rehnquist Court,
see Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalsm?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245, 330 (2008)
(arguing that the Ene doctrine might require "federal courts ... to abandon their typically
pro-defendant approaches to several key procedural issues in favor of state law standards"),
one has addressed the issue of what he calls "judicial-federalism" positions in the Rehnquist
Court, see Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections ofState and Federal Power State Judges, Federal
Law and the "Reliance Principle," 81 TUL. L. REv. 283, 287 (2006) (arguing that the
Rehnquist Court was rather consistent in its "arising under" jurisprudence in "expressing
faith in the ability of state courts to decide correctly and apply federal law"), and one has
addressed this issue with respect to Congress, see Georgene Vairo, Judicial v Congressional
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and
Other Complex Litgation, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1559, 1608-10 (2000) (arguing that
congressional legislation like the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) violated the new
federalism pronounced by the Court in substantive federalism cases).
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narratives about state courts, state law, and civil juries, arguing that
conservative Justices tend to operate from a place of distrust of state
systems, while liberal Justices tend to be more deferential. Part IV
explains the Justices' dueling narratives about the value of particular
substantive law claims. In Part V the Article explores the Justices'
narratives about the private civil litigation system, in which the
conservative Justices voice concern about innate inefficiencies and the
liberal Justices tout the system's access-creating potential. Together,
Parts II through V demonstrate that the Justices' abandonment of their
traditional federalism positions is due, at least in part, to the Justices'
appetite for taking pro-business or pro-plaintiff positions. These Parts
also establish how the Justices' narratives about the civil justice
system's functionality are reflected in their overall procedural
jurisprudence, whether the specific cases involve federalism issues or
not.
Finally, Part VI argues that in private civil litigation cases, the
Court should be guided by more traditional conservative federalism
principles. The states' interests in protecting their citizens, the
deference owed to state laws and systems, and the role that states play
in the overall regulatory regime argue in favor of subordinating federal
power in these cases. The Article closes by showing how the Court has
generally followed these conservative federalism principles in private
civil litigation cases where subject matter jurisdiction is at issue. The
Court's approach in subject matter jurisdiction cases, the Article
argues, might be a model for how the Court should weigh federalism
when deciding procedural issues in the private civil litigation context.
II. FEDERALISM DEFINED
For the purpose of this Article, federalism refers to the broad
debate over the balance of power between the states and the federal
government.1 At its most basic level, Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Alito, Anthony Kennedy," Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
14. This Article approaches these issues from a procedural perspective, not a
constitutional law one. Thus, the Article does not discuss the Court's constitutional
federalism in great detail. In other words, while the Tenth Amendment, Eleventh Amend-
ment, anti-commandeering principles, Supremacy Clause, and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment guide the Court's treatment of constitutional federalism, those issues are not the
focus of this Article. While those doctrines play a role, for example, in the Court's
preemption cases, this Article is concerned with the concept of federalism more generally, not
the detailed doctrinal analysis of how federalism is utilized in the Court's jurisprudence.
15. Justice Kennedy is thought of as the "swing vote" as he is often the deciding vote
in five-to-four cases. See Richard G. Wilkins, Scott Worthington, Elisabeth Liljenquist,
312 [Vol. 89:307
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Thomas tend to defer to state power on decisions involving substantive
law. In contrast, Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Elena
Kagan, and Sonia Sotomayor generally defer to national power. To put
it differently, when it comes to many substantive legal issues that pit
federal power against that of the states-what this Article calls
substantive federalism'"-the Court's conservative wing is expected to
side with the states, while the Court's liberal wing is expected to side
with the federal government."
A. Substantive Federabsm
While the debate over the boundaries of substantive federalism
decreased in the mid-twentieth century, it gained new steam around
1995 with cases like United States v Lopez" and City of Boeme v
Flores." Many commentators argued that the Court had embarked on
a federalism revolution.20 Cases since then have led to similar
ideological divides, fueling the debate over the bounds of federalism.21
Adam Pomeroy & Amy Pomeroy, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2007 Term, 37 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 287, 299 (2010) ("For yet another Term, Justice Kennedy's influence over the
direction of the Court is nowhere more evident than [in swing-vote cases]."). When it comes
to federalism issues, he tends to split evenly between the liberals and the conservatives, with a
slight tendency to break conservative more often. See Analysis Overview, Sup. CT.
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysisOverview.php?sid=1301-TWOFOLD-2469 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2014). As will be discussed in Parts III through V, however, when it comes to
procedural cases that implicate federalism, with the exception of one case, he sides with the
conservatives.
16. Scholars will also refer to this as "constitutional federalism." Fallon, supra note
5, at 439. This Article chooses the term "substantive federalism" in order to delineate the
distinction between cases addressing substantive law and cases addressing procedural law.
17. There are exceptions to this observation, as this Article further discusses in this
Part.
18. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (striking down a national law that prohibited guns
within 1,000 feet of a school).
19. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 was unconstitutional as applied to the states), superseded bystatute, Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized
in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Steven G. Calabresi,
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court. A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 24, 25 (2001) ("Perhaps the most striking feature of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence has been the revival over the last 5-10 years of doctrines of constitutional
federalism.").
20. Calabresi, supm note 19.
21. See, eg., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013)
(finding the Voting Rights Act's preclearance formula unconstitutional); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (holding that provisions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act could not be used to recover money damages
against the states); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (halting Florida's state court-
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This debate is well documented by scholars, who have done exhaustive
work in this area.22 Among other things, scholars have argued that the
Rehnquist federalism revolution began to dissipate before Chief
Justice Roberts took his position. Cases like Gonzales v Raich24 and
Gonzales v Oregod indicated that the Court might have slowed its
federalism movement.26 In Raich, for example, Justice Scalia
concurred in a judgment that held that federal criminal drug
possession laws could trump California's medical marijuana law.27
This position seemed antithetical to his federalism principles, leading
scholars to question the strength of the federalism movement overall.23
Debate has been similarly strong over where the Roberts Court will
take federalism in the substantive context.29 Key to this debate is an
ordered recount in the 2000 presidential election); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
602 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
712 (1999) (finding that actions against the states for violation of overtime provisions under
the Fair Labor Standards Act violated the Eleventh Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (invalidating the section of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
that imposed a duty on state law officials to conduct background checks); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
Congress from allowing Indian tribes to pursue an argument that there was a duty to negotiate
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
22. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 19; Scott Dodson, Vectorl Federalism, 20 GA. ST.
U. L. REv 393 (2003); Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 825 (1997); Fallon, supra note 5; Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1549 (2012); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of
Law: Printz andPrinciple. 111 HARv. L. REv. 2180, 2213 (1998); Larry D. Kramer, Putting
the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards ofFederahsm, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000);
James E. Pfander, Introduction, Once More unto the Breach: Eleventh Amendment
Scholarship and the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 817 (2000); Steven D. Schwinn, The
Framers' Federalism and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN. L. REv. 1071 (2012); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARv. L.REv. 78, 80 (1995).
23. Denise C. Morgan, Introduction: A Tale of(at Least) Two Federalisms, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv 615, 617 (2005-2006) ("In more recent years, however, the strong rhetoric that
the Court used in those cases has faded away and has been replaced by much more cautious,
perhaps even counter-Revolutionary, language.").
24. 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (holding that federal law criminalizing the manufacture,
distribution, or possession of marijuana was constitutional). Notably, Justice Scalia
concurred in this judgment, taking a position that favored federal authority over state law.
25. 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (enjoining enforcement of a rule that would have
criminalized physician-assisted suicide allowed under state law). In this case, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, taking a position that favored federal
authority over state law. Id.
26. Morgan, supra note 23.
27. 545 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. A. Christopher Bryant, The ThirdDeath ofFederalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 101, 149 (2007); Morgan, supra note 23.
29. The Federalist Society held a convention where the Roberts Court's federalism
was a central point of discussion. The Roberts Court and Federalism: Minutes from a
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argument about why a Justice might follow his or her traditional
federalism positions in one substantive case, but not in others.
Some argue that this incoherence is a result of outcome
determination-the Justices vary in their federalism approach in order
to achieve the results they want from case to case." Others have tried
Convention of the Federaist Society 4 N.YU. J.L. & LIBERTY 330, 333 (2009); see also
Nicole Huberfeld, Fedemalizing Medicaid 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 462 (2011) ("[T]he
Rehnquist Court began a federalism revolution that now has been at least partially adopted by
the Roberts Court."); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson,
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion m7 National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2013) ("[National Federation of
Independent Business v Sebelius] presented a prime opportunity for the Roberts Court to
revive the Rehnquist Court's 'Federalism Revolution' in the context of the Tenth
Amendment." (footnote omitted)); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the
New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the
Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1610 (2012) ("Thus, if the Roberts Court really means what it says about the
centrality of direct presidential oversight to the separation-of-powers doctrine, it should
invalidate cooperative-federalism programs on the ground that they unconstitutionally
delegate the enforcement of federal law outside the executive branch."); Cedric Merlin
Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity Results, and Neutrality, 31
ST. Louis U. Pun. L. REv 255, 325 (2012) ("The Rehnquist Court ushered in the New
Federalism, and now the Roberts Court has gone even farther in promoting post-racial
federalism." (footnote omitted)); Dan Schweitzer, Federalism in the Roberts Court, NAT'L
Ass'N Arrv's GEN. (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.naag.org/federalismin therobertscourt.php
(noting that in the first two years after Chief Justice Roberts joined "the certiorari process, the
Supreme Court [did] not agree[] to hear a single case involving the constitutional federalism
issues that formed the heart of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution"). There is also
some data suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are less pro-federalism than
the Justices they replaced-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. J.
Mitchell Pickerill, Something Old Something New Something Borrowea' Something Blue,
49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1063 (2009). However, the data was gathered only two years into
Chief Justice Roberts' and Justice Alito's terms, so it may have been too early to tell.
30. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Constitutional Newspeak: Learmng to Love the
Affordable Care Act Decision, 39 J. LEGIS. 15, 41-42 (2012-13) ("Rather, the Court's
Commerce Clause conclusion is troubling because it demonstrates the inability of federal
judges to rise above their own partisan sympathies."); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Essay,
Dissing States?:- Invalidation of State Action Dunng the Rehquist Era, 88 VA. L. REv. 1301,
1343-45 (2002) (suggesting that the division corresponds to whether underlying state action
is "liberal" or "conservative"); Fallon, supra note 5, at 474 ("[T]here are a number of
doctrinal areas in which the Court is more substantively conservative than it is pro-
federalism."); Powell, supra note 29, at 325 (arguing that the Roberts Court "radically alter[s]
its own precedent so that it directly contradicts the legislative purpose of Congress"). There
is also an argument that the Court's federalism is simply incoherent. It is not so much that the
conservative and liberal factions behave counter to their federalism principles, but that the
doctrine overall is messy. See Morgan, supra note 23, at 617-18 ("Since 2003, in cases
dealing with the Commerce Clause, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Spending
Clause, and the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has firmly held a confused (perhaps even
inconsistent) line-refusing both to definitively strip Congress of substantial authority to
regulate the states or to create individual rights that are enforceable against the states."
(footnotes omitted)).
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to locate trends in the Court's jurisprudence and construct arguments
that elegantly connect the alleged incoherence.3  What all of these
scholars have in common, however, is that they generally focus their
debate on substantive issues--civil rights legislation,32 election law,3
the Establishment Clause,34 health care law, 3 and other similarly
controversial subjects."
B. Federalism in Procedural Cases
Procedural doctrine, and more specifically procedural doctrine in
the context of private civil litigation, has been largely unexamined with
respect to the Justices' federalism positions. This Article focuses on
that gap-private civil litigation cases where the decision regarding a
procedural question places federal power in tension with state power.
The Article does not discuss procedural cases where the state is a party
to that litigation-sovereign immunity cases, for example." Those
cases tend to follow the trends discussed in the substantive federalism
arena.3 1 Moreover, the focus of this Article is to unpack what drives
3 1. See Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism,
3 HARv. L. & PoCY REv. 33 (2009) (outlining changing conceptions of federalism throughout
history); Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the Law" The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SuP. CT. REv. 253, 255-56 (arguing that at least in the
preemption context, the Court's cases can be explained without a resort to outcome
determination).
32. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Fallon, supra note 5; Sally E Goldfarb, The Supreme
Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use andAbuse ofFederalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REv. 57 (2002).
33. See, e.g., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
34. See, eg., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute,
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803, asrecognizedin Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Fallon,
supra note 5.
35. See, eg., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
36. See, eg., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (state sovereign immunity); Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (firearm background checks); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (tribal relations).
37. 1 excluded cases addressing official and sovereign immunities. The focus of this
Article is on civil litigation between private parties. The immunity cases, while presenting
federalism issues, are different because the defendants are government entities or officials. I
also excluded the sole abstention case because it was an anomalous case regarding Rooker
Feldnan abstention.
38. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006) (rejecting the
sovereign immunity defense of state agencies in a proceeding by a bankruptcy trustee to
recover a debtor's preferential transfers); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,
725 (2003) (holding that a state's failure to comply with a provision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act effectively abrogated its sovereign immunity from suit).
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the Justices' decision making in the private civil litigation context
because that is where, the Article argues, the Justices' views regarding
civil litigation are most identifiable.
It is admittedly less common to see pure federalism issues arise in
these kinds of federal procedural cases, however. There is simply less
opportunity for federal and state procedural law to conflict. Many
federal procedural cases interpret the federal rules of procedure. With
the exception of Eie0 cases where state and federal laws are
potentially in conflict, cases interpreting the federal rules do not affect
state procedure directly.4 In addition, many other procedural cases
interpret federal statutes and their attendant procedures.42 These cases
are much less likely to affect state courts and state law to any great
degree.
However, there are private civil litigation cases where the
resolution of the procedural issue implicates federalism, such as
preemption cases where the critical legal question is whether federal or
state substantive law will apply.4 3 There are also the aforementioned
Eie cases, a species of preemption, which present the question of
whether a federal rule of procedure will trump state law." Finally,
there are cases where the Court limits a constitutional procedural
doctrine like personal jurisdiction, which can sometimes prevent a
39. There are certainly cases involving state or federal officials that raise the
narratives discussed in this Article. For example, conservative Justices are arguably hostile to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against police officers. See, eg., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132
S. Ct. 1235, 1241 (2012) (holding that, in an alleged Fourth Amendment violation action,
police officers had qualified immunity because they had acted in an objectively reasonable
manner and did not fit within the narrow exception that would have barred immunity). That
position would fall under the substantive law claim hostility discussed below in Part IVA. It
would be interesting to look at all procedural cases and assess the trends discussed in this
Article, but that is beyond the scope of this piece. For the purpose of this Article, the inquiry
is limited to private civil litigation. By singling out private civil litigation, as opposed to all
civil litigation, the Article focuses on how federalism should be treated even when the state is
not a named party to the case.
40. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (holding that in federal diversity
cases, state substantive law and federal procedural law should apply).
41. For example, the most talked about pleading cases of late, BellAtlantic Corp. v
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007), and AshcroRf v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009),
interpreted a federal rule of procedure governing pleadings. Those cases do not implicate
state courts unless those courts elect to follow what the federal courts have done. See, eg.,
McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 233 P.3d 861, 867 (Wash. 2010) (refusing to apply Iqbalto
Washington state procedure).
42. See, e.g., Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2211 (2011) (interpreting the requirements
of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and whether attorneys' fees were allowed).
43. See discussion frna Part III.
44. See discussion imfm Part IV
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state court from litigating a state law remedy.45 These types of
procedural cases are the subject of this Article.
C Methodology
In order to determine which cases to review for this Article, I
looked at all of the procedural cases decided by the Roberts Court
during the 2005 through 2013 Terms.46 The term "procedural cases"
was defined to include any cases interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, cases interpreting procedural doctrines such as
personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction, and cases
interpreting standard court procedures like attorneys' fees and costs.47
45. See discussion infa Part III.
46. There are markedly more procedural cases in the Roberts regime. As Howard M.
Wasserman reveals in The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REv. LriG.
313, 314 (2012), the Court in its first six terms "heard and decided more than twenty cases in
core civil procedure areas."
47. One case, Philp Monis USA v Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), was not included
in this initial collection of procedural cases. The Court found that the Oregon Supreme Court
had used the wrong constitutional standard when reviewing a punitive damages award. Id. at
357-58. This had the effect, at least initially, of striking down a state court's award of punitive
damages. The Court seemed to base its reasoning on procedural due process grounds. Id. at
357. However, many commentators have observed that the Court in this case (and similar
cases that preceded it, like BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)) was
more accurately basing its decision on substantive due process grounds. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Foreword, The Constitution and Fundamental Rights, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
PoI'y, at xii (2007) (listing Philip Monisas a substantive due process case); Jill Wieber Lens,
Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 BYU L. REv. 1, 19
("Despite the procedure-looking language in Phillip [sic] Monis, just as with BMW many
believe Philip Momis was based on substantive due process grounds-substantively
prohibiting a punitive damage award from punishing the defendant for harm caused to
nonparties."). Because of the incoherence of the Court's reasoning in this area, the case was
excluded. However, even if the case were included in the data set, the Court's decision largely
supports this Article's thesis. Justices Scalia and Thomas, as they did in BAM-W dissented
from the opinion rejecting the state's punitive damage award. Philip Momis, 549 U.S. at 362-
64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This was a traditionally conservative federalism position
because it maintained the state court's (and the state jury's) damage award in a state law case.
As Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent, "I would accord more respectful treatment to
the proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought diligently to adhere to our
changing, less than crystalline precedent." Id at 364. (Justice Stevens similarly dissented,
using conservative federalism language. Id. at 358 (Stevens, J., dissenting).) While Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined these two liberal Justices in taking a conservative federalism
position, their fellow conservative Justices-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and
Alito-did not. This breakdown of Justices, while not cleanly along liberal and conservative
lines, demonstrates the arguments made in Part III regarding the Justices' shifting positions
when federalism and private-party civil litigation intersect with regard to state courts and state
juries. See discussion infia Part III. Ultimately, the jury verdict stood because, upon remand,
the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Philip Morris was procedurally barred from
contesting the jury instructions that served as the basis for their challenge to the punitive
damage award. See Lyle Denniston, Tobacco Punitive Verdict Stand, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar.
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Once that batch of cases was collected, I excluded any cases where the
state government, federal government, or a foreign entity was a party.48
That left forty-seven cases in the pool. Of those forty-seven cases,
fifteen cases presented questions implicating federalism principles.
Among those fifteen cases, five general categories of cases
emerged: arbitration, consumer preemption,49 class action, personal
jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction. Once these categories
were determined, I then went back to the data set and pulled all of the
cases in each of these categories, without regard to whether they
presented federalism issues or not. The point of looking at the
nonfederalism cases in each category, as will be discussed in the
following Parts, was to gain a fuller understanding of what other
ideological principles might be determinative for the Justices in the
private civil litigation context.
From the analysis of these fifteen cases and the related cases in
those categories, three distinct narratives about private civil litigation
emerged. Those narratives are as follows: (1) the Justices' attitudes
toward state courts, state law, and civil juries; (2) the Justices' positions
regarding certain substantive law claims; and (3) the Justices' views
about the value of private civil litigation. This Article argues that these
narratives tend to animate the Justices' decision making in the
procedural context far more than any specific federalism ideological
position might. In the Parts that follow, this Article will examine each
31, 2009, 10:05 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/03/ruling-on-jury-seating/. The
Court refused to revisit this case and denied certiorari to review the state court's decision. See
id.
48. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
49. Preemption is a subject that is often discussed in the substantive federalism
literature. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Essay, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. Rcv 601,
601-06 (2013) (discussing preemption in the immigration context). Yet, preemption is a
complex and multifaceted area of the law. See id. at 608 ("[P]reemption doctrine is messy.");
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown in Our Constitudonal
System, 84 TuL. L. REv. 1143, 1154-55 (2010) (noting that "issues of federal preemption are
... badly handled" in the courts). In many of the articles cited above, scholars discuss all
preemption cases in the context of substantive legal developments. This Article focuses on
consumer preemption cases, meaning that it only looks at litigation by private litigants against
business entities. The point is to put this subset of preemption cases in the context of other
procedural cases that tend to make it more difficult for individual or small business plaintiffs
to bring their claims against business entities. See inm note 50 and accompanying text. The
inclusion of preemption cases here and in articles regarding substantive federalism also
shows the complexity of dividing substance and procedure. That discussion, however, is also
not the focus of this Article. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth ofErie, 87 HARv. L.
Ruv. 693, 724 (1974) ("We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the fluidity of the
line between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry no monolithic
meaning at once appropriate to all the contexts in which courts have seen fit to employ them
need not imply that they can have no meaning at all." (footnote omitted)).
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of these narratives in turn. Within that analysis, the Article will
highlight how each respective narrative provides a compelling
justification for why the Justices tend to abandon their traditional
federalism positions when making procedural decisions in the context
of private civil litigation.
III. STATE COURTS, STATE LAW, AND CIVIL JURIES
The first narrative finds the conservative Justices questioning the
competency of state courts and, by extension, their laws and juries.
This distrust of civil juries and state court systems leads the Justices to
utilize certain procedural devices that are more likely to locate cases in
federal court. In contrast, the liberal Justices tend to favor civil juries
and, in that vein, are more deferential to state courts and state law in
this context. Thus, the liberal Justices are often in the position of
arguing in favor of keeping a case in state court.
A. Keeping Cases out ofState Courts
The complex relationship between federal and state courts
becomes tense when federal courts appear to take claims away from
the states. Yet, this is exactly what consumer preemption cases do-
they take a state law claim away. A related tension arises when the
Court does not allow a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant that has injured one of its citizens. There, one could argue,
the federal court is also taking a state law remedy away. In other
words, these decisions would appear to be an affront to the Justices
who wish to protect states' rights because they are taking away the
states' power to adjudicate their citizens' claims.
1. The Federalism Procedural Cases
Yet, in recent consumer preemption cases,"o the conservative
Justices have repeatedly taken positions that disfavored the state. For
50. The nonconsumer preemption cases will not be addressed in this Article. See
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2260 (2013) (holding that the
National Voter Registration Act preempted Arizona's "evidence-of-citizenship" requirement);
Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2013) (holding that the Federal Employees' Group
Life Insurance Act of 1954 preempted a Virginia statute); Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v.
Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (2013) (holding that the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act did not preempt the plaintiff's state law claims related to the storage and
disposal of a towed vehicle); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding
that sections of Arizona statute SB 1070 were preempted by federal law); Chamber of
Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (holding that Arizona's
licensing laws were not preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act); Rowe v.
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example, in Altria Group, Inc. v Good, the question was whether
federal law preempted the plaintiffs' state law claim that advertising
was fraudulent when it conveyed the inaccurate message that so-called
"light" cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine.5 1 Justice Thomas,
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Alito argued in the
dissent that federal law expressly preempted state law claims that
would affect the warning labels on cigarettes.52 Similarly, the same
Justices minus Justice Thomas dissented in Wyeth v Leve." They
argued that the Federal Drug Administration's (FDA) approval of the
drug's warnings preempted the plaintiff's state law claim.54
In PLIVA, Inc. v Mensng, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Y
Barlett56 and Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC," Justices Alito and Kennedy,
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia and Thomas held that federal
law prevented plaintiffs from bringing their state tort law claims." In
all of those cases, the plaintiffs had allegedly suffered serious
consequences from taking a particular pharmaceutical product. For
example, in Bartlet4 the plaintiff was prescribed and took a generic
form of an anti-inflammatory pain reliever called sulindac." She had a
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 367 (2008) (holding that Maine's state laws
regulating the delivery of tobacco were preempted); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 74 (2006) (holding that plaintiff's claims were preempted by Title I
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998). While these cases certainly
implicate federalism, they are less important from a procedural standpoint. In other words,
these cases are less likely to prevent individual plaintiffs from bringing state law claims the
way that the consumer preemption cases do.
51. 555 U.S. 70, 73 (2008). The Court found that the plaintiffs were not making an
argument based on Altria Group's failure to warn, but were instead making a fraud claim-
the defendant knew that its statements about the benefits of light cigarettes were not true
because it knew that cigarette smokers would smoke more and in such a way as to defeat the
benefit of the filters. Id at 87.
52. Id at 107-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
53. 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). Levine brought state law claims
of negligence and strict liability against Wyeth, arguing that its failure to instruct clinicians
against the use of the IV-push method of administering the drug was inadequate. Id at 558
(majority opinion). The state court rejected the preemption argument, and at trial, the jury
found for Levine and awarded her over $7 million in damages. Id at 562-63. The Supreme
Court affirmed. Id at 563.
54. Id at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting).
55. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
56. 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2013).
57. 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011).
58. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572; Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476; Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at
1075. As will be discussed, Justice Breyer wrote separately to concur in Levine. 555 U.S. at
582.
59. 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
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"horrific" reaction to the drug, developing toxic epidermal necrolysis.o
She sued Mutual Pharmaceutical Company (Mutual), the maker of the
generic drug, in New Hampshire state court on a state law theory of
design defect." She won over $21 million in damages before a jury,
but Mutual appealed, arguing that her claim was preempted according
to the Court's decision in PLIVA.6 2 That decision held that because
federal law required the generic drug label to be the same as the brand-
name drug label, the generic brand could not just alter the label's
warnings on its own." Thus, a plaintiff was unable to challenge the
inadequacy of the warning labels under state tort law.' In Bartlett, the
conservative majority, as they did in PLIVA, found that it was
impossible for Mutual to comply with both federal and state law."
Bartlett like PLIVA and Bruesewitz, ultimately prevented a private
plaintiff from utilizing state law to remedy her grievance against a
corporate defendant.
Similarly, in a recent personal jurisdiction case, a largely
conservative block found that a state court had incorrectly asserted
personal jurisdiction over a company whose product had injured a state
citizen. In J McIntyre Machnery Ltd v Nicastro, Robert Nicastro
sued J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. (J. McIntyre) in a New Jersey state
court after his hand was seriously injured using one of the company's
metal-shearing machines." J. McIntyre was a British company that
manufactured scrap metal machines." J. McIntyre did not have any
direct contact with New Jersey." At least four of its machines were
60. Id. at 2472. This led to almost 65% of her body being burned off or turned into




63. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
64. Id. at 2573.
65. Bartlet4 133 S. Ct. at 2473. Complying with New Hampshire law would have
required the company to change its warning labels, something that is not allowed under
federal law. Id at 2476.
66. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). The Court's other personal jurisdiction decision,
Goodyear Dunlop Tres Operadons, SA. v Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), was a relatively
uncontroversial decision. See Michael H. Hofiheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REv. 549, 550-51 (2012)
("[ Goodyear received less attention than Nicastro, which provoked a spirited dissent and was
greeted with much criticism and alarm." (footnote omitted)).
67. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
68. Id. at 2790. Justice Kennedy argued, "The British manufacturer had no office in
New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it neither advertised in, nor
sent any employees to, the State." Id
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sold to clients in New Jersey, but the sales took place through an
independent distributor.'
When Nicastro sued J. McIntyre in a New Jersey state court, that
court determined that it had personal jurisdiction over J. McIntyre."
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed." The United States
Supreme Court reversed in a fractured opinion. First, Justice Kennedy
wrote an opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia and Thomas. In that opinion, he argued that J. McIntyre had not
"purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within [New Jersey]."72 More specifically, he argued that J. McIntyre
had in no way "targeted" New Jersey." It was "not enough that the
defendant might have predicted that its goods [would] reach the forum
State."74 Instead, the defendant needed to do more to demonstrate that
it meant to take advantage of New Jersey's benefits and laws. Simply
distributing the machines nationally in the United States, attending
shows throughout the United States (but not in New Jersey), and
selling only four machines in the state was not enough to meet this
standard.75
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that personal jurisdiction was a
concept grounded in the Due Process Clause and thus was a matter of
personal liberty." However, in a move that bespoke federalism, he also
argued that state sovereignty was in play." If New Jersey were to
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant when it did not properly
obtain it, "it would upset the federal balance, which posits that each
State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by
other States."W In other words, if another state properly had personal
69. Id. at 2786. Instead, an independent distributor, McIntyre Machinery America,
Ltd., was J. McIntyre's exclusive distributor in the United States. Id. at 2796. Plaintiff could
not sue McIntyre Machinery America, however, because it declared bankruptcy and was no
longer operating at the time of the suit. Id. at 2796 n.2.
70. Id. at 2786.
71. Id at 2785. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the "injury occurred in
New Jersey" and that the company "reasonably should have known 'that its products are
distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products being
sold in any of the fifty states."' Id at 2786 (quoting Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd.,
987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010)).
72. Id at 2787 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 2788.
74. Id
75. Id. at 2790.
76. Id at 2789.
77. Id
78. Id.
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jurisdiction over J. McIntyre," allowing New Jersey to assert personal
jurisdiction improperly would not only offend the liberty rights of J.
McIntyre, but would also offend the sovereign rights of that other
state."
Justices Breyer and Alito wrote separately to concur in the
judgment finding that New Jersey did not have personal jurisdiction
over J. McIntyre, but they backed away from Justice Kennedy's
"seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule."" In a more limited fashion and
under existing law, Justices Breyer and Alito found that on the facts
before them-four machines in New Jersey, but otherwise no other
contact with the state-there was not enough for New Jersey to assert
personal jurisdiction.82
2. Federalism Falls to State Court Distrust
In all of these cases, the conservative Justices do not mention any
federalism principles that would defend that state's ability to provide a
state law remedy to its citizens. As will be discussed in the next Part, it
is instead the liberal Justices who praise a system that is deferential to
states. Even when Justice Kennedy discussed federalism in Nicastro,
79. This premise is questionable because J. McIntyre had similarly slim contacts with
each of the individual states. Its aggregate contacts with the United States were significant,
but because it used a distributor, its state-to-state contacts were minor.
80. Id Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the "state sovereignty" argument
justifying personal jurisdiction had been abandoned, but he included this section regarding
state sovereignty nonetheless. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (holding that personal jurisdiction is guided by a
constitutional due process analysis and not by state sovereignty).
81. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2791. Justices Breyer and Alito form the key concurrence in Nicastro,
which allowed the conservative Justices to prevail in the case, but did not give them the
critical votes they needed to solidify their narrow reading of personal jurisdiction. They both
deserted their traditional ideological allies. Part of the Justices' hesitancy in finding personal
jurisdiction in this case centered on the concern that a small business owner could unwittingly
be subject to the varying tort laws of the fifty states by selling his product. Id at 2794. At the
same time, the Justices were concerned that siding with the plurality would result in a "strict
no-jurisdiction rule" in future cases, which would involve how Internet commerce figured
into the entire personal jurisdiction schema. Id. at 2793. These Justices kept the law from
moving in either direction, so it is interesting that their concurrence consists of one liberal
Justice and one conservative Justice. Perhaps their defections, for lack of a better term,
simply demonstrate prudence. By allying with one another, they prevented the law from
moving at all. Because of this alliance, however, it is difficult to know how they might vote
in the next personal jurisdiction case the Court takes. For a detailed account of Nicastro, see
Paper Symposium, Making Sense of Personal Jurisdiction Alter Goodyear and Nicastro, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 827 (2012); Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-Fhst
Centwy: The Implications of McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 63 S.C. L. REv. 463
(2012).
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it was not with an eye toward the federal/state distribution of power, it
was instead about the power relationship between the states
themselves."
For the conservative Justices, their positions are converse to their
traditional federalism stance. Yet, put in a different context, the
Justices are fairly consistent. That context is not a federalism one, but
is instead the context of attitudes regarding the civil justice system and
how it affects business interests. When it comes to state courts, and
oftentimes their juries, the conservative Justices are much more likely
to work to keep cases out of the state system.84 By keeping cases out
of the state courts and closing off state law remedies, businesses
benefit." Thus, in the cases discussed above and in the related
opinions from the Roberts Court, there is a strong narrative of state
court distrust.
The Court's preemption jurisprudence provides ample
opportunity to understand the conservative Justices' views of state
court civil juries. For example, in Levine, the dissent articulated the
conflict as one between a federal agency and a "state tort jury."" On at
least six occasions, the dissent called out the jury and its decision as
being in conflict with the FDA." The dissent's language is dismissive,
referring to the jury as some "jury in Vermont" and stating that the
case had allowed "drug labeling by jury verdict."" The dissent's
contemptuous attitude about juries' competence and inability to
understand complex cases is implicit in the Justices' language. For
83. 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
84. See Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Courts Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1097, 1107-08
(2006) ("Indeed, a plausible case can be made that the vehemence with which the Court's
majority reacted to the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in the 2000 presidential election
cases stems as much from their hostility towards the role the Florida Supreme Court carved
out for itself in resolving the dispute as from the political valence of the state court
decision.").
85. See, eg., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 581, 593 (1998) (finding that plaintiffs' win rates in federal civil cases were
57.97%, but when a case was removed from state to federal court, the win rate dropped to
36.77%); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability The 1990s and
Beyond, 78 TUL. L. REv 1247, 1315 n.333 (2004) (stating that in the study of 80 product
liability cases decided between 1990 and 2003, "[p]laintiffs fared slightly better in state
courts (57% pro-plaintiff law) than in federal courts (46% pro-plaintiff)").
86. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 605 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 604-05, 628 ("jury in Vermont"); id at 606, 612 ("drug labeling by jury
verdict"); id at 626-27 ("jury's cost-benefit analysis in a particular case may well differ from
the FDA's").
88. Id at 605, 612, 628.
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instance, the conservative Justices argued that the FDA had decided
against ordering the labeling that would have been required by Levmne
for more dangerous drugs like mustard gas. The insinuation there was
that the FDA-far more expert in the field-must have known what it
was doing, while the civil lay jury had gotten it wrong." The dissent
expressed distaste for this result when it stated that "a jury in Vermont
can now order for Phenergan what the FDA has chosen not to order for
mustard gas.""
Justices Breyer and Alito have also overtly questioned the
competence of juries, state courts, or both in the personal jurisdiction
context. In Nicastro, the Justices expressed concern about small
business purveyors who distribute their products throughout the United
States." They argued that a broad reading of personal jurisdiction
would mean that these small businesses would be subject to "the wide
variance in the way courts within different States apply" their
respective tort laws.92 They cited statistics showing the range of
"plaintiff winners in tort trials" in a number of counties across the
United States." That range-17.9% to 69.1 0/-was intended to show
volatility in the respective states' tort regimes and was in the very least
meant to suggest that the win rates were a proxy for the inaccuracy of
those regimes.9
A related theme in these cases is that business interests are not
well served by a fifty-state court system. For example, in Altria
Group, Justice Thomas bemoaned that the case would allow "juries to
decide, on a state-by-state basis, whether petitioners' light and low-tar
descriptors were in fact fraudulent."" In another section, Justice
89. Id at 628.
90. Id Questioning the competence of civil juries is not wholly the province of
conservative Justices, however. For example, Justice Breyer in his concurrence in Bruesewitz
explicitly questioned whether it makes sense to allow a jury to "second-guess" the
determinations made by the experts in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act's no-fault
compensation regime. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1085 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring). In that case, however, it seemed that Justice Breyer was not so much
questioning the competence of a civil jury, but was instead arguing that Congress has created
a regime where experts are weighing in on the safety of the drugs in an effort to minimize tort
litigation. To that end, one could argue he was simply being deferential to these experts.
Even still, his rhetoric about civil juries can be interpreted as a criticism of their functionality.
91. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Thomas H. Cohen, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. 12 (Nov. 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01.pdf).
94. Id (citing Cohen, supra note 93, at 11).
95. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 107 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas argued that the case would "open[] the door to an untold
number of deceptive-practices lawsuits across the country" that "would
almost certainly be [decided] differently from State to State.",6 The
inconsistent results to be obtained across different states would lead to
the kind of indeterminacy that the conservative Justices find so
troublesome. Indeed, how can businesses plan ahead and comply with
the law when that law is subject to the whim of juries in fifty different
states?"
This point was also made in Levine, where the conservative
Justices questioned the ability of a jury to conduct the kind of complex
cost-benefit analysis required to regulate pharmaceutical drugs." The
dissent argued that "juries are ill equipped to perform the FDA's cost-
benefit-balancing function" because they "tend to focus on the risk of
a particular product's design or warning label that arguably contributed
to a particular plaintiff's injury, not on the overall benefits of that
design or label."" Because the parties who benefited from the drug are
not in the court and the jury is unable to appreciate the vast benefits
the drug may have had, all they can see is the devastation that the drug
has caused."oo Thus, juries are unreliable in their ability to weigh the
drug's benefits against the explicit cost they witness in the courtroom.
The same theme emerged in Bruesewiz, where the conservative
majority argued that Congress and the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act had done what was necessary to preserve public safety in
the vaccine market, such that any intermeddling by civil tort juries
would upset that system.'
Relatedly, the conservative Justices worry that tort litigation can
be a societal harm because it affects business incentives. In
Bruesewitz, the majority wrote that civil litigation had driven vaccine
manufacturers out of business and created shortages in the vaccine
96. Id at 108 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 553 (1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
97. A somewhat related sentiment is found in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
PA. v Allstate Insurance Co. One of Justice Scalia's main concerns in Ene cases is to
maintain uniformity in how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. He wrote of the
"very real concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be chaos." Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 413 (2010). Uniformity in
the federal rules of procedure is a benefit to business interests, who can obtain top-notch legal
counsel with the capability of practicing in federal courts all across the United States. Justice
Thomas's concerns about different substantive tort standards in Alria Group are just like
Justice Scalia's concerns about different procedural standards from state to state.
98. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 626 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1079 (2011).
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market.'02 There was concern for public safety, of course, but there was
also concern for corporate profit margins and economic incentive
structures. For example, the majority noted that one of the
manufacturers "estimated that its potential tort liability exceeded its
annual sales by a factor of 200.""' Similarly, in Altia Group, the
conservative dissent worried that business interests would be burdened
if there were fifty different rules across the United States.'" The
concern that businesses be free of a litigation burden, or in the very
least be able to predict potential exposure to liability, is especially
pronounced in an area like product liability.o"
The conservative Justices' hostility to state law claims because of
the harm they might do to business interests is also found in the
personal jurisdiction case of Nicastro. There, the plurality expressed
concern about a "small Florida farm[er]" who "might sell crops to a
large nearby distributor," only to have them distributed across the
country.'06 That farmer, Justice Kennedy argued, might be "sued in
Alaska or any number of other States' courts without ever leaving
town."o' The conservative Justices repeatedly argue that small
businesses might not engage in commerce if there is a possibility of
being held accountable in all fifty states. The irony in Nicastro, of
course, is that the company-like all of the companies in the
preemption cases-was not a small business. In fact, it was a large
international company.' Nonetheless, a paramount concern for the
102. Id. at 1073.
103. Id.
104. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 108 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. This line of reasoning is not confined to conservative Justices, however. At least
in the context of statutory damages and class actions, Justice Ginsburg in Shady Grove used
similar language to warn against abuse of class actions. She stated that New York's law in
that case was meant to "prevent the exorbitant inflation of penalties-remedies the New York
Legislature created with individual suits in mind." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 445 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Moreover, she noted
that "[w]hen representative plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may be
heightened because a class action poses the risk of massive liability unmoored to actual
injury." Id. at 445 n.3. Her language seems critical of class actions, but unlike the
conservative Justices' opinions, it is limited to class actions in the context of statutory
damages-a context that many commentators and judges, whether they are liberal or
conservative, might reasonably agree is ill-suited to the class action mechanism. Indeed, as
Justice Ginsburg noted in Shady Grove, Congress has limited the availability of class actions
in certain legislation providing for statutory penalties. Id. at 450.
106. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2786. For a discussion of how a formalist approach to the conception of
sovereignty in Nicastro was a mistake, see Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and
Dysfunctional Role ofFormalism in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEwiS &
CLARK L. REv 905, 963 (2012) ("However plausible the formalist justification of state
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conservative wing appears to be how business incentives are affected
by a fifty-state tort regime.'o9
B. State Courts as Regulators
In the previous Subpart, the Article examined how conservative
Justices do not raise federalism concerns in the context of private civil
litigation, even when the states' power is being diminished by federal
power. This is in stark contrast to liberal Justices who regularly
rehearse pro-states' rights rhetoric in this context. This plays out in
both preemption and personal jurisdiction cases.
1. The Federalism Procedural Cases
For example, in Altria Group, the majority, which included
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter, determined
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not
expressly or impliedly preempt state law."0 The Justices made strong
federalist statements, arguing that federal law should not supersede
state law without a clear statement by Congress, especially "when
Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the
States."" Similarly, in Levine, these same Justices held that Wyeth
could be held liable for its failure to instruct clinicians against
particular uses of its drug, even when the drug had already been
approved by the FDA.12 The majority stated that in all preemption
cases, there is a presumption against preemption out of "respect for the
States as 'independent sovereigns in our federal system."""
territorial sovereignty's role in personal jurisdiction doctrine domestically, the plurality's
concern with upsetting the federal balance of sovereign power among the states is misplaced
in the international context of national sovereignties." (footnote omitted)).
109. In fact, even Justice Breyer in his concurrence with Justice Alito made the same
kind of argument. They worried about the "small manufacturer" like "an Appalachian potter"
and whether it would be fair to subject him to personal jurisdiction in every state. Nicastro,
131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). The Justices also worried about international
manufacturers ("a small Egyptian shirt maker") for the same reason-that those small
purveyors, by selling their product to an American distributer, could be subject to the tort law
of every state. Id at 2794.
110. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 73 (2008).
Ill. Id.at77.
112. Wyethv. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558-59 (2009).
113. Id at 565 n.3 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, arguing that Wyeth could have complied with
both state and federal law. Id at 583 (Thomas, J., concurring). In other words, there was no
impossibility. He wrote separately, however, to step away from the majority's discussion of
the "purposes and objectives" line of preemption cases. Id. at 583, 594. Justice Thomas has
been wary of "purposes and objectives" preemption cases because the "potentially
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When dissenting in preemption cases, the liberal Justices
articulate similar states' rights concerns. In PLIVA, these Justices
stated that the majority's decision "threaten[ed] to infringe the States'
authority over traditional matters of state interest-such as the failure-
to-warn claims here-when Congress expressed no intent to pre-empt
state law."" 4 In Bar1et the dissenting Justices"' argued that Mutual
could have complied with both state and federal law "either by not
doing business in the relevant State or by paying the state penalty, say
damages, for failing to comply with, as here, a state-law tort
standard.""' Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority for "its revision
of [the plaintiffs] state-law claim through an implicit and undefended
assumption that federal law gives pharmaceutical companies a right to
sell a federally approved drug free from common-law liability.""' As
in PLIVA, the liberal Justices argued that state law was "comple-
mentary" because "Congress' preservation of a role for state law
generally, and common-law remedies specifically, reflects a realistic
understanding of the limitations of ex ante federal regulatory review in
this context.""' Finally, in Bruesewitz, Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg argued in the dissent that the plaintiffs should not have been
prevented from bringing their claims against a vaccine manufacturer
because of federal law."9
In the Nicastro dissent, Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor
used similar pro-state language when discussing personal jurisdiction.
These Justices completely reset the narrative of the case, casting J.
McIntyre as a "foreign industrialist" whose company's "goal [was]
simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can," meaning that it
boundless" doctrine relies on the Court's "interpretation of broad federal policy objectives,
legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not contained
within the text of federal law." Id. at 587.
114. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2589 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
115. The dissent included Justices Breyer, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg.
116. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 2482-83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2484.
119. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1086 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kagan did not sit for this case. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment.
While he generally sided with the liberal block on these issues, he did not here. He argued
that the majority's textual argument was good, but that what really decided the issue for him
was the legislative history and statutory purpose. Id. at 1083. Largely because the
congressional history indicated that Congress determined that the increase in tort suits had
led manufacturers to begin thinking about getting out of the market, Justice Breyer concluded
that the plaintiff's suit was preempted. Id. at 1084.
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"exclude[d] no region or State from the market it wishe[d] to reach." 20
Justice Ginsburg argued that, against existing precedent, the Court had
allowed the manufacturer to escape jurisdiction by simply "engag[ing]
a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside." 2' Citing the fact that
New Jersey processed the most metal recyclables of any state, that
Nicastro's boss first learned of the offending machine while at a
convention in Las Vegas, and the company's profits and general
targeting of the U.S. market, the dissent argued that jurisdiction was
appropriate. 12 2 Justice Ginsburg wrote, "On what sensible view of the
allocation of adjudicatory authority could the place of Nicastro's injury
within the United States be deemed off limits for his products liability
claim ... ?"123 In contrast to Justice Kennedy's version of federalism,
which worried about the other states that might have a claim to
personal jurisdiction in this case, the dissent worried about the state
where the injury occurred and its interest in protecting its citizens from
products directed there.124
2. Federalism Used To Bolster State Court Access
What these cases generally reveal is that, like the conservative
Justices, the liberal Justices tend to sound different federalism themes
in these procedural cases. Instead of relying on their traditional
federalism arguments that generally place more stock in federal
authority, the liberal Justices use language that lauds the states and
questions the authority of the federal government.
This is because, like the conservative Justices, the liberal Justices
tend to elevate their concern for particular litigation stakeholders over
their federalism principles. In the context of their regard for plaintiffs
and their claims, the liberal Justices suspect that state courts, state law
remedies, and civil juries might provide a more winnable set of
circumstances for individual plaintiffs than the federal regime.'25 Thus,
as opposed to narratives about federal power, the liberals highlight
what they see as the benefits of a robust state law system.
120. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2797.
123. Id.
124. Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that there was no other state who had a better
claim to this case because the injury occurred in New Jersey. Id. at 2798; see Koppel, supra
note 108.
125. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 85; Symeonides, supra note 85.
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First, according to the liberal Justices, the state court system
provides a regulatory function that supplements a resource-strapped
federal regulatory regime. For example, in Levine, the liberal majority
argued that "state law offers an additional, and important, layer of
consumer protection that complements FDA regulation."'26 Because of
incentives that state tort suits provide, the Court argued, manufacturers
are more likely to disclose risks quickly, victims are more likely to
come forward with important information, and hazards are more likely
to be discovered.'2 7 Essentially, the Court maintained that the FDA had
only "limited resources" with which to monitor all of the drugs hitting
the market, making state tort suits essential to the regulation of
potentially dangerous drugs.28 Similarly, in Bartlett the liberal
Justices discussed the "significant resource constraints" of federal
agencies that limit their ability to "protect the public from dangerous"
products.'29
A related theme was found in PLIVA. There, the Justices stated
that the majority decision "creates a gap in the parallel federal-state
regulatory scheme in a way that could have troubling consequences for
drug safety."' Because there was no longer a state law route to
regulating generic drug manufacturers, the Justices argued that the
decision "eliminate[d] the traditional state-law incentives for generic
manufacturers to monitor and disclose safety risks.""' This "additional
... layer of consumer protection" is a critical concern for the liberal
Justices.'32 The same was true in Bruesewit, where the liberal dissent
argued that the majority's decision left "a regulatory vacuum in which
no one ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately take account of
scientific and technological advancements when designing or
distributing their products."'
In addition, the liberal Justices counter the narrative that
businesses cannot successfully account for litigation risks in their
business models. In Nicastro, for example, the dissent argued that
companies can and do purchase insurance in case their products prove
126. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009).
127. Id. at 579.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
130. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
13 1. Id.
132. Id at 2593 (quoting Levine, 555 U.S. at 579) (internal quotation marks omitted).




defective.3 4 This insurance is not prohibitively expensive; in fact, J.
McIntyre had such insurance."' Moreover, states, in an effort to
protect their citizenry, enact state statutes that are meant to reach
offending companies when defective products injure their citizens."'
These statutes and the states' efforts to protect their citizens, the dissent
argued, should be respected. And because businesses like I McIntyre
are fully aware of these litigation risks, defending a case in New Jersey
should be considered a "reasonable cost of transacting business
internationally.""'
Finally, the liberal Justices tend to focus on the aggrieved party.
The dissent in Nicastro argued that the company's burden to litigate in
New Jersey was small, especially when contrasted with the burden the
plaintiff would incur by travelling overseas to bring his case "for an
injury he sustained using McIntyre's product at his workplace in
Saddle Brook, New Jersey.""' In contrast to the conservative Justices'
concern about business defendants, the liberal Justices expressed
concern about the individual plaintiffs."' Bartlett also demonstrated
this divide. The conservative Justices accused the liberal Justices of
being too emotional about the "tragic" events of that case.140  The
liberal dissent countered that the Court had "turn[ed] Congress' intent
on its head" and that "[a]s a result, the Court ha[d] left a seriously
injured consumer without any remedy despite Congress' explicit
efforts to preserve state common-law liability.""' In other words, each
faction tends to focus on the party which they believe needs the most
protection in civil litigation. Doing so leads them into narratives about
the benefits and costs of state courts, state laws, and state remedies-
narratives that divide depending on how each of these respective
parties are best served.
134. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2799 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
135. Id. The study cited by the dissent stated that the insurance could cost "only
sixteen cents for each $100 of product sales." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136. Id. at 2800.
137. Id. at 2800-01.
138. Id. at 2801.
139. Id. at 2801-02.
140. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466,2478, 2480 (2013).
141. Id at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE LAW CLAIMS
In the second narrative set, the conservative Justices appear
dubious of certain kinds of substantive cases like discrimination and
product liability. This doubt emerges in their opinions and may seem
overtly anti-plaintiff. But, it is certainly not the case that the
conservative Justices always find against plaintiffs.142 To the contrary,
the conservative Justices' suspicions are aimed at a subset of
substantive claims. In contrast, the liberal Justices appear to support
plaintiffs who bring substantive claims in the areas where conservative
Justices seem to apply more scrutiny.
A. Skepticism ofPaticular Substantive Law Claims
When it comes to state-created substantive claims, one might
expect conservative Justices to endeavor to preserve those rights in the
face of federal conflict. Yet, that picture is far more complicated than it
might seem. In the following Subpart, the conservative Justices
demonstrate that in procedural cases, they are prone to use procedure
to inhibit plaintiffs' access to adjudicating particular substantive
claims.
1. The Federalism Procedural Cases
A complicated reversal of federalism principals also occurred in
the context of a class action case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
PA. v Allstate Insuance Co."' Shady Grove defies categories, but for
this Article, it will be treated as a class action case. Sonia Galvez was
injured in an automobile accident and sought medical care for those
injuries at Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates (Shady Grove).'" In
order to cover part of the cost of that care, she assigned her rights to
certain insurance benefits under an Allstate policy. Shady Grove
sought those benefits, which under New York law had to be paid or
denied within thirty days of submission. While Allstate paid the claim,
142. For example, in the criminal context, the conservative Justices will often side with
the state and against the individual defendant. Robert H. Smith, Uncoupling the "Centrist
Bloc"-An Empircal Analysis of the Thesis of a Domiant, Modemte Bloc on the United
States Supreme CourZ 62 TENN. L. REv. 1, 39 (1994) (discussing the data showing that the
"conservative justices were highly cohesive and strongly pro-prosecution in their voting,
contrasted with the liberals who were extremely cohesive in voting in favor of defendants").
143. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). While the Court ultimately allowed the class action to go
forward, and thus allowed the case to be adjudicated, it is an exception to the trend in most of
these cases. See discussion infa Parts VA.2, VB.2.
144. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
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it was late doing so. Moreover, when it finally paid Shady Grove, it
refused to pay the statutory interest that was due on the late payment.
Seeking this statutory interest, Shady Grove filed a suit on its
behalf and on behalf of all others to whom Allstate had refused to pay
statutory interest.'45 Shady Grove argued that Allstate routinely refused
to pay this interest in violation of state law.'46 The federal district court
dismissed the case because it determined that a New York state law
precluded these types of suits.'47 More specifically, section 901(b) of
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules prohibited any litigation
seeking a "penalty" from going forward as a class action.'48 Because
Shady Grove could not bring a class action and because its alleged
$500 in individual damages did not satisfy the minimum amount in
controversy, the court dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction.'49 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'o
Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joined."' Justice Scalia's
position was fairly straightforward: section 901(b) directly conflicted
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.152 Rule 23 allows for class
actions, while section 901(b) did not. That, according to Justice Scalia,
required the federal rule to trump. " He refused to look beyond the
plain text of section 901(b) and take account of the law's legislative
history, arguing that doing so would make the Eie determination far
too cumbersome for courts.154
Following the Court's Eie line of cases, Justice Scalia argued that
Rule 23 regulated procedure, thus meeting the requirements of the
Rules Enabling Act.' 5  Once a state rule like section 901(b) conflicts
with Rule 23 in federal court, then, the state rule cannot be applied.
He wrote that a class action was "no less than traditional joinder (of






150. Id. at 398.
151. Id. at 395-96. Justice Sotomayor did not join the section of the Scalia plurality
that takes Justice Stevens to task for his concurrence. Also, Justice Stevens wrote a separate
concurrence and concurred in the judgment while Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy, and
Alito dissented. This will be discussed in greater detail in Parts VA.2 and VB.2.
152. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 399.
153. Id. at 399-400.
154. Id. at 405.
155. Id. at 408; see28 U.S.C. §2072 (2012).
3352014]
TULANE LA WREVIEW
adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate
suits,""' Further, "like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties' legal
rights and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged."' As to
the argument that allowing the case to go forward turns the litigation
from a $500 suit to a $5 million suit, Justice Scalia responded by
acknowledging that "some plaintiffs who would not bring individual
suits for the relatively small sums involved will choose to join a class
action."' Yet, according to Justice Scalia, the inducement effect of the
class action was just the "sort of incidental effect" that the Court held
would not violate the Rules Enabling Act."
This plurality opinion is thus unusual for a couple of reasons.
First, a largely conservative majority refused to apply a state law,
calling into question their federalism allegiance. And, second, a largely
conservative majority somewhat celebrated, and in the very least did
not deride, the class action-a procedural device to which it has been
otherwise quite hostile."'o Finally, Justice Scalia did not make one
mention of federalism. Only Justice Stevens in his concurrence and
Justice Ginsburg in her dissent discussed that subject.'6'
2. Federalism Yields to Substantive Claim Skepticism
In the cases discussed in this Article, the conservative Justices
have generally retreated from their traditional federalism positions. In
this Subpart, the Article argues that these Justices' distaste for
particular kinds of substantive claims leads them to give a little on




160. See discussion infra Part IVB. 1.
161. Justice Stevens complicates Shady Grove a bit more because he joined in the
judgment, but wrote separately in a concurrence. The details on his concurrence are beyond
the scope of this Article, but the upshot is that he agreed with the result in the case but wanted
to reserve judgment on a case where the state procedural rule really did function "as a part of
the State's definition of substantive rights and remedies." Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 417
(Stevens, J., concurring). This is where Justice Stevens struck a states'-rights chord. He
wrote:
In our federalist system, Congress has not mandated that federal courts
dictate to state legislatures the form that their substantive law must take.. .. [T]o
ignore those portions of substantive state law that operate as procedural devices ...
could . .. limit the ways that sovereign States may define their rights and remedies.
Id at 420. For a detailed discussion of Shady Gove, see Adam N. Steinman, Our Class
Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules EnablingActAfler Shady Grove, 86 NOT RE DAME L.
REv. 1131, 1134 (2011).
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federalism in order to gain a little in discouraging particular kinds of
substantive claims.
In the preemption context, it seems that the conservative Justices
are arguably hostile to product liability cases. Whether this hostility
comes from a view that the cases are frivolous is not entirely
knowable. Even so, skepticism about product liability cases does not
necessarily arise exclusively from a belief that the claims are frivolous.
Aside from questions of legitimacy, what seems to motivate the
Justices' concern about these types of claims is the sense that the civil
justice system, specifically state tort law, is not the best vehicle to
address product liability. This view was expressed in PLIVA, Bartlet,
and Bruesewtz.162 To a large degree, the Justices argued that
regulatory agencies have done the work of protecting numerous
consumers, work that from an ex ante perspective may have protected
far more consumers than we can ever know. To allow state tort
systems to come in and question that system by protecting some of the
consumers that were not otherwise protected is an inept ex post move.
This is because it does not properly account for the careful decision
making on the front end by the regulatory regime. For example, in
Bartlet4 the conservative majority acknowledged the plaintiff's
"dreadful" injury, but warned that the Court's response could not be
guided by passion and sympathy.' Instead, the Court had to follow
the law, which, according to the majority, did not require the drug
manufacturer to stop selling a potentially dangerous drug.'" This
world view--one that seems to defer to business actors-often leads
the conservative Justices to take a position that looks quite hostile to
product liability claims.'
The conservative Justices' aversion to certain kinds of substantive
claims is not limited to product liability, however. Looking more
broadly at the procedural cases in these categories that do not present
federalism issues, the Justices also demonstrate a distinct skepticism of
discrimination claims.'" For example, in the class action case Wal-
162. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466 (2013); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
163. 133 S. Ct. at 2478.
164. Id. at 2477 ("Our pre-emption cases presume that an actor seeking to satisfy both
his federal- and state-law obligations is not required to cease acting altogether in order to
avoid liability.").
165. See also Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 3 (arguing that the pro-business
charge is misplaced and better explained by taking an ex ante view of what rule will work
best for most, but not all, consumers).
166. See, e g., Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
501 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, The Petrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
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Mart Stores, Inc. v Dukes, the conservative Justices exhibited far more
skepticism of the plaintiffs' claims than the liberal Justices did. 7 The
Dukes plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart's policy of giving local
managers discretion over pay levels and promotions, in addition to the
company's overall culture of hostility to women, had resulted in an
unlawful discriminatory impact on female employees."' All of the
Justices agreed that the class should not have been certified under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), but the liberal Justices
disagreed with the conservative Justices' treatment of commonality
under that rule.' The specifics of that disagreement over
commonality are beyond the scope of this Article, but because of that
disagreement, the conservative and liberal Justices had to discuss the
merits of the gender discrimination allegations.'
What this exchange demonstrated was that the conservative
Justices were not so much concerned about the nature of this
substantive claim because of the harm the litigation might do to
business interests, although there was some of that when the majority
talked about the vast scope of the Dukes case.'7 Unlike in the product
liability cases, the conservative Justices actually appeared to overtly
question the claim's legitimacy. To put it differently, the conservative
Justices seemed to have a presumption against gender discrimination.
For example, the Dukes plaintiffs presented three different types
of evidence for their claims. They offered statistical evidence about
the alleged pay disparities, anecdotal evidence of discrimination from a
subset of the plaintiff class, and sociological evidence about Wal-
Mart's culture and its personnel practices."' Justice Scalia, writing for
the conservative majority, took issue with all of this evidence.
"Liability Cisis," and Efficiency Clichd's Eroding Our Day in Court and Juy Tnd
Conmitrnents?, 78 N.YU. L. REv. 982, 984-87 (2003); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Changing Shape ofFederal Cid Pitral Practice: The Dispaiate Impact on Civil Rights and
EmploymentDiscrimnation Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dangers of Summary Judgment Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L.
REv. 705, 766-67 (2007).
167. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555-56, 2562-63 (2011).
168. Id at 254.
169. Id at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The liberal
Justices also left open the possibility that the class could have been certified under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. For a detailed account of
Dukes, see Symposium, Class Action Rollback? Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class
Action Litigation, 62 DEPAUL L. REv 653 (2013).
170. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-57 (majority opinion); id at 2562-65 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171. Id at 2547 (majority opinion) ("most expansive class actions ever").
172. Id at 2549.
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Justice Scalia argued that Wal-Mart's express policy prohibited
sex discrimination, and he was unwilling to accept the sociologist's
expert opinion to the contrary. This was because the expert could not
pinpoint how many of the employment decisions in the company were
affected by the "strong corporate culture" that made it more
susceptible to "gender bias."' Given this doubt, Justice Scalia
defaulted to his presumption that "left to their own devices most
managers in any corporation-and surely most managers in a
corporation [like Wal-Mart] that [expressly] forbids sex
discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria
for hiring and promotion."'74 In other words, instead of assuming that
the sociological evidence might show that the corporate culture results
in a large number of discriminatory decisions being made, the
conservative Justices presumed the complete opposite-that most
managers will do the "right" thing."' They could not believe that
managers across the country would act in a discriminatory way, across
the board, without direct orders from the company to do so."' Justice
Scalia wrote, "In a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical
scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their
discretion in a common way without some common direction."77
Because the "common direction" was that managers could not
discriminate on the basis of gender, the Justices assumed that most, if
not all, managers followed that edict."' Justice Scalia also questioned
the value of the statistical evidence.'7 ' He argued that looking at
regional or national data did not demonstrate the "store-by-store"
disparity that plaintiffs alleged.' Moreover, he asserted that most
managers will claim to have used some "sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria," a claim that he and the other conservative Justices
seemed inclined to believe. 8'
173. Id. at 2553 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Id. at 2554.
175. Id.
176. Id at 2555.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2556-57.
179. Id. at 2555.
180. Id.
181. Id. The conservative Justices' scrutiny of discrimination claims is reflected in




B. Greater Concern for Particular Substantive Law Clains
The conservative Justices' scrutiny of particular kinds of
substantive rights is countered by the liberal Justices, who on many
occasions take a friendlier stance. As this Subpart will discuss, the
liberal Justices tend to take a pro-federalism position in an attempt to
further the viability of certain substantive claims to which they are
sympathetic.
1. The Federalism Procedural Cases
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia did not overtly discuss the
federalism issues in that case. Yet, it was that exact principle that
animated Justice Ginsburg in her dissent. Justice Ginsburg argued
strongly for resolving EDie questions in a way that would respect states'
rights. She stated that she "would continue to interpret Federal Rules
with awareness of, and sensitivity to, important state regulatory
policies." 82 Eie itself was one of the "cornerstones of our federalism,"
thus the Court must act "with an eye alert to . . . avoiding disregard of
State law.""' In Shady Grove, Justice Ginsburg argued that the state's
interest in preventing excessive damages was a substantive rule
deserving of deference under the Rules Enabling Act.'" She argued,
"The fair and efficient conduct of class litigation is the legitimate
concern of Rule 23; the remedy for an infraction of state law, however,
is the legitimate concern of the State's lawmakers and not of the
federal rulemakers."1'" Because of "the impropriety of displacing, in a
diversity action, state-law limitations on state-created remedies,"
Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision "ero[ded] ...
Eie's federalism grounding.""' Thus, like the other categories of cases
in this Part, the liberal Justices strongly articulated positions protective
of states' rights, while the conservative Justices tended to side with the
federal government.
182. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 437
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 438 (quoting Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. at 442.
185. Id at 447.
186. Id. at 457-58.
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2. Federalism Used To Further the Viability of Substantive Claims
In the context of these federalism cases, the conservative Justices'
scrutiny of particular kinds of substantive rights is countered by the
liberal Justices, who on many occasions take a friendlier stance. For
example, in contrast to Justice Scalia's scrutiny of the plaintiffs'
evidence in Dukes, Justice Ginsburg took a position that showed her
confidence in the allegations made. While Justice Scalia was skeptical
of the statistical evidence, Justice Ginsburg noted that while women
held 70% of the hourly jobs at Wal-Mart, they only made up 33% of
the company's management.17 She also took issue with Justice Scalia's
presumption that managers would act according to Wal-Mart's official
polices. The managers' discretion to pay employees anywhere within a
$2 band at every level, Justice Ginsburg argued, left open the distinct
possibility that management's "unconscious bias" would win out and
result in Wal-Mart's notable gender pay gap.' In other words, Justice
Ginsburg approached this gender discrimination case from a position
that was far more likely to accept the possibility of such
discrimination. She stated, "Managers, like all humankind, may be
prey to biases of which they are unaware."' Justice Ginsburg's
opinion discussed unconscious bias and drew an inference from the
evidence in that direction, while the conservative Justices inferred the
opposite behavior-one of nondiscrimination-from the same
evidence. This distinction demonstrates that the liberal Justices tend to
be more receptive to certain kinds of substantive claims than their
conservative counterparts.
This same distinction is apparent in the Court's consumer
preemption cases. The liberal Justices do not give as much scrutiny to
the potential frivolity of product liability claims, for example. Instead,
the Justices focus on the consumer protection function served by the
operation of state law in the product liability arena. Thus, in PLIVA,
Justice Sotomayor lamented that the "traditional state-law incentives"
for ensuring that manufacturers "monitor[ed] and disclose[d] safety
risks" were severely threatened by preemption cases that closed off a
state law route to litigation.' This was especially true in PLIIA
because, as Justice Sotomayor argued, generic drugs make up 75% of
187. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18 8. Id.
189. Id. at 2564.
190. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2592 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the pharmaceutical drugs dispensed in the United States."' Similarly,
in Bruesewitz, Justice Sotomayor wrote of the "regulatory vacuum"
created because plaintiffs could not bring state law claims.'
Moreover, just as the conservative Justices tend to focus on the
defendant corporations in product liability and discrimination cases,
the liberal Justices tend to focus on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs and
their claims, more than the defendant businesses, are at the forefront of
the liberal Justices' opinions. For example, in Nicastro, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the plurality's opinion not only negatively
impacted plaintiffs with domestic product liability claims, it also put
those plaintiffs at a disadvantage relative "to similarly situated
complainants elsewhere in the world."' In other words, Justice
Ginsburg argued that plaintiffs with tort claims in other countries, like
the United Kingdom, had more access to their respective court systems
than plaintiffs in the United States did.'94
The narratives regarding substantive claims further demonstrate
the proclivity the conservative and liberal factions have for protecting
certain parties. In this context, across product liability and
discrimination claims, the Justices can generally be categorized by
their support for corporate defendants or their support of individual or
small business plaintiffs. As these narratives demonstrate, this division
ends up being a better predictor of how the Justices will vote than any
concerns about federalism might be.
V. CIVIL LITIGATION
Finally, the third narrative set involves the Court's view of the
civil litigation system and its efficiency. The conservative Justices
express skepticism regarding the civil justice system, criticizing the
cost of litigation and the impact of frivolous claims.' The liberal
Justices express concern about failures in the civil litigation system,
but are more concerned about access.
191. Id.at2583.
192. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1086 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
193. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
19 4. Id.
195. This is arguably a continuation of the Rehnquist Court's similar hostility. See
Siegel, supra note 84 (examining the Rehnquist Court's hostility toward civil litigation); see
also Wasserman, supra note 46, at 332 ("The Roberts Court has shown similar hostility to
litigation as a means of vindicating legal rights, the apparent difference being that this Court's
hostility manifests itself in general procedural doctrine.").
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A. Cost and Inefficiency
The final narrative in the conservative Justices' civil litigation
opinions is a critique of the cost and inefficiencies of civil litigation.'"
The concern is that the amount of time and money it takes to defend a
case is prohibitive. This leads to what the conservative Justices argue
are coerced settlements-litigation where the defendant, while perhaps
right on the merits, will settle instead of risking costly litigation.'"
1. The Federalism Procedural Cases
AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion perfectly models the
federalism quandary discussed in this Article.'" Concepcion involves
arbitration, class action, and consumer preemption. It is ultimately
thought of as an arbitration case because it demonstrates the degree to
which the Court's conservative faction will use the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) to support arbitration, as well as the ways in which the
Court's liberal faction will attempt to restrain arbitration and allow
plaintiffs to bring cases in state or federal court.
In Concepcion, the plaintiffs purchased cellular service with
AT&T.'99 They became part of a class action filed against AT&T for
false advertising and fraud because the company's advertised "free"
phones actually cost about $30 each.2" AT&T moved to compel
arbitration according to its cellular service agreement with its
customers.20' That agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes
and prohibited any class or representative proceedings.202
The Supreme Court of California, in a case called Discover Bank
v Superior Court of Los Angeles, had already held that class action
waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion were unconscionable, and
thus void, under California law.203 Citing Discover Bank, the United
196. See Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litgaton, 80 U CHI. L. REv 1007,
1073 (2013) (discussing the lack of empirical data supporting the argument that there is too
much civil litigation).
197. See Miller, supm note 166.
198. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
199. Id at 1744.
200. Id The Concepcions and other purchasers had to pay sales tax in order to get the
"free" phones. Id
201. Id at 1744-45.
202. Id. at 1744.
203. Id at 1745-46. The DiscoverBankcourt held:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining
power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers
2014] 343
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States District Court for the Southern District of California found that
AT&T's arbitration provision prohibiting class or representative actions
was unconscionable under California law.20 The question was whether
this finding of unconscionability was enough to invalidate the contract
under the FAA.205 Section 2 of the FAA provides that an arbitration
agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."206  According to the district court, AT&T's contract failed
under generally applicable California law. In other words, arbitration
was not singled out, and thus the finding of unconscionability rendered
the arbitration agreement void under the FAA. 207 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating, "Discover
Bank placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the
exact same footng as contracts that bar class action litigation outside
the context of arbitration."208
The majority of the Court-Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alitoisagreed.2 09 They found
that the Discover Bank reading of state law singled out arbitration
agreements and frustrated the purpose of the FAA. 210 The Court stated,
"Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA."211 After assessing bilateral and class
arbitration, the Court determined that "[a]rbitration is poorly suited to
the higher stakes of class litigation."212 This determination ultimately
led the Court to reject the California Supreme Court's interpretation of
out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in practice
the exemption of the party "from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury
to the person or property of another." Under these circumstances, such waivers are
unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (citation omitted)
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2012)).
204. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
205. See9 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
206. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
207. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
208. Id. (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990
(9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Justice Thomas wrote separately in a concurrence. Id. at 1753-56 (Thomas, J.
concurring). He argued that the savings clause of section 2 of the FAA applied only to the
formation of the contract, while the Discover Bank rule discussed contracts that would not be
enforced as against public policy. Id at 1756. Thus, according to Justice Thomas, section 2
was not even implicated by the DiscoverBankrule in the first place.
210. Id at 1748 (majority opinion).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1752.
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its own state law. It did so by arguing that federal law under the FAA
trumped state law. In other words, the conservative Justices elevated
their view of what the FAA allowed over that of the states.
2. Efficiency Concerns Elevated over Federalism
In civil litigation, the conservative Justices express doubt about
plaintiffs' and their lawyers' motivations and credibility. In
Concepcion, for example, the Court noted that even though potential
plaintiffs could use bilateral arbitration, they would not.2 3 The Court
stated that "there is little incentive for lawyers to arbitrate on behalf of
individuals when they may do so for a class and reap far higher fees in
the process."214 The insinuation being made, as is often made in the
civil context, is that many lawyers are driven by fees alone and not by
the validity of their clients' legal disputes.2 15 This is especially true in
consumer cases where those consumers are challenging allegedly
unfair business practices or product safety.
Along with this distrust of some of the players in the civil
litigation game, the conservative Justices express a related skepticism
of how well the civil justice system works. In Concepcion, the Court
determined that class arbitration, as opposed to bilateral arbitration,
was antithetical to the FAA because it "sacrifices the principal
advantage of arbitration-its informality-and makes the process
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass
than final judgment."216 Class arbitration is governed by rules that are
based on the federal class action rules.217 Thus, while bilateral
arbitration offers a respite from the slow, costly morass that is our civil
litigation system, class arbitration would not.218
The Justices' concern was one-sided, however. When it came to
plaintiffs, the Court dismissed out of hand the unfairness of contracts
of adhesion by noting that "the times in which consumer contracts
were anything other than adhesive are long past."2 ' For business
defendants, it was a different story. The conservative Justices focused
213. Id. at 1750.
214. Id
215. This insinuation is common among the public and politicians as well. Arthur R.
Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections
on the Deformation ofFederal Procedure, 88 N.YU. L. REv 286, 302 (2013) ("Politicians and
special interests ... vilify the plaintiffs' bar as fee-hawking ambulance chasers.").
216. 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
2 17. Id.
2 18. Id.
219. Id. at 1750.
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on the necessity of bilateral arbitration. The lack of meaningful
appellate review in arbitration, the Justices thought, would make class
arbitration much too risky for businesses. After all, arbitration does
not provide for de novo review because review "under § 10 focuses on
misconduct [by the arbitration panel] rather than mistake." 220  The
Justices explained that given these limitations, "[a]rbitration is poorly
suited to the higher stakes of class litigation."221 Indeed, "[t]he point is
that in class-action arbitration huge awards (with limited judicial
review) will be entirely predictable."2 22 This led them to conclude that
"defendants would [not] bet the company" if class arbitration was an
option for plaintiffs.223 In other words, to the extent class arbitration
looked like civil litigation, defendants would not choose arbitration at
all.
Setting aside whether the Justices' critique of the civil litigation
system is empirically supported or not,24 as the Concepcion dissent
pointed out, it is undisputed that there is no empirical evidence to
support the conservative Justices' arguments about class action
arbitration.225 Yet, these Justices maintained that if class arbitration was
allowed to become the norm, it would undoubtedly lead to a system
that is as dysfunctional as they perceive our civil justice system to be."'
Predicting this fate, the Justices made comparisons that, while not
empirically supported, fit into their negative civil litigation narrative
perfectly.
220. Id. at 1752.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1752 n.8.
223. Id. at 1752.
224. There is good evidence that it is not. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, News from
Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U L. REv. 77, 77-79 (1993)
(demonstrating that many of the statistics and much of the rhetoric criticizing civil litigation
are inaccurate); Miller, supra note 166.
225. The dissent challenged as unfounded the majority's assertion that class arbitration
was so complex that it would discourage arbitration altogether. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at
1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the majority had no empirical support for
its argument and that comparing class arbitration to bilateral arbitration was the wrong
metric. A more accurate comparison-from the defendant's perspective-would be to pit
class arbitration against class action litigation. That comparison would show that class
arbitration is preferable. Id at 1759-60.
226. At least one commentator has predicted that the Court's hostility to class
arbitration in Concepcion is a means to an end with regard to class actions more generally.
Cliff Palefsky, Closing Thoughts on the Arbitation Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 26,
2011, 6:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-the-arbitration-
symposium/ ("My sense is that the elimination of class actions is not merely a possible result
of the [Concepcion] decision; rather, it was pretty clearly the goal of the majority.").
[Vol. 89:307346
CIVIL-IZING FEDERALISM
Thus, the conservative Justices' opinions attempt to maintain
much of what they see as the advantages of arbitration intact. In this
case, it meant closing off the possibility of class arbitration. The
premium these Justices place on maintaining arbitration as a perceived
efficient and fair system for defendants is also borne out by other
arbitration decisions during this period. These opinions do not involve
federalism issues like Concepcion, but collectively, they lend support
to the argument that the conservative Justices view the civil litigation
system as costly and inefficient.227
For example, in Stolt-Nielsen SA. v AnknalFeeds International
Corp.,228 the Court took the rather rash step of overturning an
arbitration panel's decision, which requires a finding of misconduct
and not a mere mistake.229 Stolt-Nielsen involved a maritime dispute
among parties who were all agreeably subject to an arbitration
provision. When the complaining parties demanded class arbitration
even though the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, the
parties agreed to submit the class question to their arbitration panel.230
That panel decided to allow class arbitration, but stayed the proceeding
in order to allow for judicial review33 The district court reversed the
arbitration decision, but the Second Circuit disagreed.232
The majority of the Court-Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-reversed the Second
Circuit and held that allowing class arbitration when the parties had
not explicitly agreed to it was not in line with the FAA.' Acknow-
ledging that the interpretation of arbitration agreements is generally
done under state law, the Court highlighted the importance of the
purposes of the FAA-namely the enforcement of the contractual
agreement between the parties.234 Here, the parties' silence could not
be read as consenting to class arbitration, which, as the Court argued in
Concepcion, was so inferior to bilateral arbitration. The Court stated,
"We think that the differences between bilateral and class-action
227. For a detailed discussion of recent arbitration cases, including Concepcion, see
Symposium, US. Arbitration Law hi the Wake ofAT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 4 Y.B. ON
ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2012).
228. 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010).
229. Under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, an arbitration panel's decision can only be
vacated if the moving party shows that the arbitrator "exceeded [his or her] powers." Id. at
670.
230. Id at 666-69.
231. Id. at 669.
232. Id. at 669-70.
233. Id. at 683.
234. Id at 682.
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arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume ... that the parties'
mere silence ... constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class
proceedings."235
In Stolt-Nielsen, the conservative wing once again prevented
class arbitration from easily finding its way into the arbitration process.
The other three five-to-four decisions in the arbitration context, 14
Penn Plaza LLC v PYett 236 Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v Jackson27' and
American Express Co. v Italian Colors Restauran238 similarly
enforced arbitration agreements against the individual or small-
business plaintiffs in those cases, keeping the case out of the civil
litigation system.239 In each of those cases, the plaintiffs attempted to
litigate in the civil justice system, but the Court decided arbitration
provided their sole recourse.240
235. Id at 687.
236. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
237. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
238. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). The vote was actually five-to-three because Justice
Sotomayor did not take part in resolving the case.
239. In Pyett, the question was whether a collective bargaining agreement requiring
union members to only arbitrate their Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims was
enforceable under federal law. The Court's majority-Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito-found that it was, while the dissent-Justices
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer-disagreed. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 274 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id at 278 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Rent-A-Center, the majority, which was the
same as in Pyett, held that a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate the enforceability of the
arbitration contract was enforceable. 561 U.S. at 72. The dissent-Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor-rejected this assertion and argued that the enforceability
of the arbitration agreement should be decided by the court, not the arbitrator. Id at 80
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In Italian Colors Restaurant, the same Pyett and Rent-A-Center
majority upheld a waiver of class arbitration even though an individual's recovery in the
antitrust claim would far exceed the cost of proving the antitrust violation. 133 S. Ct. at
2312. The dissent-Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer-disagreed, arguing the
arbitration clause was antithetical to federal law because it prohibited a party from bringing a
federal claim. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
240. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247; Rent-A-Ctr, 561 U.S. 63; Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304. The outlier cases in this category, Preston v Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008), and Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C v Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), were not close splits and
involved businesses on both sides of the dispute, so they will not be addressed in detail here.
Similarly, Marmet Health Care Center v Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), and Nitro-Lift
Technologies, L.L.C v Howar 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012), were unanimous opinions (per
curium in the case of Nitro-Lid) holding that state courts blatantly disregarded the FAA. In
addition, Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013), was a unanimous
opinion that upheld the arbitration panel's decision to allow class arbitration. But that case
pitted a business interest against another business interest, so it does not implicate the
concerns discussed in this Article. Finally, Vaden v Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009),
while ostensibly about arbitration, was really a case about federal question jurisdiction and
whether a federal court could take subject matter jurisdiction over an otherwise state law case
on the basis of a federal counterclaim. It is discussed in Part VI nfra.
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In sum, all of the five-to-four arbitration cases show the
conservative Justices' negative view of the civil litigation system. By
giving primacy to arbitration over civil litigation, the Justices
demonstrate their skepticism of the civil litigation system overall.
This negative view of civil litigation is similarly visible in the
Court's class action opinions. Much like the rhetoric discussed in the
arbitration opinions addressing the availability of class-wide relief, the
conservative Justices are skeptical of the benefits of the class action
device. To that end, they seem primed to strike down class actions,
especially when the defending party is a corporate entity. For example,
in Comcast Corp. v Behrend the conservative Justices scrutinized
evidence the plaintiffs presented in order to certify the class, even
though by all accounts that question was not properly before the
Court.241 Behrend did not raise any federalism issues, but the case
further demonstrates the conservative Court's hostility towards class
actions. Similarly, Dukes did not raise federalism concerns, but the
conservative Justices' efforts to completely prohibit that class action by
effectively closing down any certification under Rule 23(b) show again
that corporate interests are elevated by the conservative members of
the Court.242
This skepticism of procedural mechanisms like the class action
may explain why some of the federalism cases discussed in this Article
have been decided by the Justices in ways, which at first blush, might
seem unexpected. Shady Grove provides the most interesting of shifts
among the Justices. The combination of Eie and class actions created
some strange bedfellows indeed. However, there is a tenable
explanation that still fits with the main argument in this Article. The
lineup of Justices depends, in large part, on whether a Justice is
playing a long game or a short game. For Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the game is a long one.
241. 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1436 (2013) ("Abandoning the question we instructed the parties
to brief does not reflect well on the processes of the Court." (quoting Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767, 772 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
242. There are two other class action cases that were decided by the Roberts Court. In
Amgen Inc. v Connecticut Retnrement Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined the majority to find in favor of class certification,
while Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented, taking a more ideologically typical
position against class certification. In Erica P John Fund Inc. Y Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct.
2179 (2011), the Court was unanimous in holding that the plaintiffs did not have to prove loss
causation in order to certify their class. Like in Amgen, the parties in Erica P John Fund
were both moneyed interests. Id. at 2183. Like many of the opinions discussed in supra note
240, where business interests are on both sides of the litigation, the civil litigation narratives
discussed in this Article are less salient.
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As this Subpart has argued, the conservative Justices are
generally hostile to class actions. Why then would they be in the
majority of a case allowing a class action to go forward?243 One reason
is that because the class action is a device that is unlikely to be
eliminated altogether, the better course-and long game-is to get as
many class actions into federal court as possible. In federal court, the
law is far more hostile to class actions because of the narrowing and
scrutiny of class certification.'" In addition, because of CAFA,245 more
class actions are being funneled from state court into federal court.246
Shady Grove continues this trend by allowing a class action to go
forward, but in federal court only. The Justices were possibly willing
to take the hit of allowing a class action to be filed in the short term for
the long-term gain of continuing to restrict class actions at the federal
level.247 Justices Kennedy and Alito were playing the short game,
however. They took the position that honored the arguably substantive
243. Even Justice Ginsburg points out the irony of this result in her Shady Grove
dissent. She argued that Congress passed CAFA in order "to check what it considered to be
the overreadiness of some state courts to certify class actions." Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., PA. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 459 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("In
other words, Congress envisioned fewer-not more-class actions overall. Congress surely
never anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecca for ... class actions seeking
state-created penalties for claims arising under state law-claims that would be barred from
class treatment in the State's own courts.").
244. David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism
Implications of Diversity Jursdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1247, 1281 (2007)
("[Flederal courts have demonstrated a systematic impatience with the aggressive use of Rule
23 in multistate cases with state law causes of action. This hostility .. . appears to reflect an
emerging consensus against certain uses of the class action device." (footnote omitted)).
245. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see Marcus, supra note 244, at 1252 ("CAFA supporters
hope that this federalization of multistate class actions will result in fewer certified classes
and thereby relieve defendants of liability for state law causes of action.").
246. A 2008 study performed by the Federal Judicial Center revealed a 72% increase
in class action suits filed in or removed to federal district courts since the passage of CAFA.
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., The Impact ofthe Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 on the Federal Courts, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG 1 (Apr. 2008),
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/cafa04O8.pdf.
247. There is also no doubt that Shady Grove is consistent with Justice Scalia's
previous and fierce defense of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Where he sees a conflict
between state law and a federal rule of procedure, he has consistently argued that the federal
rule trumps. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 467 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 trumps any state law
in conflict); Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (finding
that Rule 41(b) was not in conflict with state law and thus allowing the district court to apply
state preclusive law in evaluating the effect of another district court's dismissal). Uniformity
in the civil rules largely benefits business interests, so these cases, while decided outside the
window of the Article's timeline, are in line with the Article's argument. See supra note 97
and accompanying text.
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law of the state-a strong conservative federalism position-and they
were also able to side with stronger business interests.248
The conflict of all of these different interests can result in some
anomalies with how the Justices line up on federalism cases that
include procedural issues. But, the conservative Justices' general
predisposition for business interests and the liberal Justices'
predisposition for plaintiffs remain fairly constant.
B. Access to Justice
As much as the conservative wing can be said to feed into a
negative view of civil litigation, the liberal wing's narrative reveals a
view of the civil litigation system focused on access. In procedural
opinions more generally, these Justices often place a premium on
minimizing procedural barriers and allowing for access to the civil
justice system.
1. The Federalism Procedural Case
In Concepcion, the liberal Justices-Breyer, Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan-took the completely opposite position of their
conservative counterparts. First, the dissent argued that the Discover
Bank rule was generally applicable to all contracts and therefore did
not single out arbitration agreements.249 The dissent noted that
California had the right to decide that the incentives created by
prohibiting class arbitration were too dangerous. Such a prohibition
would encourage commercial actors to fraudulently take a small
amount of money from a large number of consumers.250 Because no
lawyer would represent one client for such insignificant damages, the
prohibition on class arbitration effectively insulates this kind of
behavior from any legal action.25' California decided to eliminate this
perverse incentive by finding that some class arbitration waivers were
unconscionable. For the Court to then upend this decision by the state
of California was, according to the dissent, an affront to federalism.252
Concepcion was a case that so clearly placed state law in
opposition to federal law; yet, the liberal Justices advocated for state
law to override the FAA. They made statements that, without knowing
248. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).




252. Id. at 1762.
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who wrote them, one might assume had been drafted by the Court's
conservative wing. For example, the dissent stated, "California is free
to define unconscionability as it sees fit, and its common law is of no
federal concern so long as the State does not adopt a special rule that
disfavors arbitration."253 It is less common to see the liberal Justices
making this kind of pro-state statement, yet, in the procedural context,
the Justices' ideological commitment to their view of federalism seems
to wane.
2. Federalism as a Means to Access
Concepcion exemplifies the degree to which the liberal Justices
will attempt to maintain access to the civil justice system. In that case,
the liberal wing argued against the FAA and for the state law. One can
assume that these Justices are skeptical of arbitration, especially in
situations where the resource disparity between the parties is so great.
Yet, having accepted the reality of arbitration, the Justices focus on
pro-plaintiff decisions within that context. Thus, if adhesion contracts
requiring arbitration are in fact the norm, then it is better for plaintiffs
to have access to class arbitration than solely to bilateral arbitration.
These Justices' support for class actions in the civil litigation context is
echoed in their support of class arbitration. In civil litigation, the
Justices argue that potential plaintiffs will not have access to the legal
help they need if they are unable to aggregate their claims into a class
action. Similarly, the Concepcion dissent argued that plaintiffs like the
Concepcions would be unable to find an attorney to take on a $30
damages lawsuit.254 Without class arbitration, claims like these-
which are now generally subject to arbitration-will not be pursued.255
Instead of viewing this issue through a lens of efficiency, these Justices
look to access.
253. Id. at 1760.
254. Id at 1761.
255. See, eg., David L. Noll, RethinkingAnti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 649, 650 (2012) (explaining that the basic premise behind aggregate claiming is to
lessen the burden of process costs overtaking the stakes in individual proceedings and
encourage private attorneys to prosecute violations of law without concern for a money-
losing proposition); Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not Be
Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 676-79 (2011) (noting a trend among courts
that finds class waivers unconscionable and the aggregate claim a fundamental right of the
plaintiff). But see David Horton, FederalArbitation ActPreemption, Purposivism, and State
Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217 (2013) (arguing that Concepcion may possibly be read to




Consequently, just as the conservative Justices' nonfederalism
arbitration opinions demonstrate their civil justice narrative, the liberal
Justices' positions in these opinions is similarly telling. Stolt-Nielsen
is an apt example because the liberal Justices argued in favor of the
arbitration panel's decision in that case."' They did so in the face of
their skepticism of the arbitration system as a whole because that
particular arbitration panel allowed the plaintiffs to proceed as a
class.257 Because the liberal wing believes that class arbitrations might
provide a more just proceeding for plaintiffs than bilateral arbitration,
as they described in Concepcion, the Justices were more willing to
enforce an arbitration panel's pro-class decision.
This is in contrast to Rent-A-Center, where the liberal Justices
argued that the court and not the arbitration panel should decide the
arbitration agreement's enforceability.258 But, that case involved
bilateral arbitration and pitted an individual plaintiff against a large
corporate defendant.' In other words, the access-based decision in
that case was to take enforceability from the panel, while in Stolt-
Nielsen, the access-based position was to sustain class arbitration in
any way possible. Pyett also involved an individual plaintiff against a
corporate defendant in bilateral arbitration. There again, the liberal
Justices dissented in favor of the individual plaintiff, finding that he
should not have to arbitrate solely under the collective bargaining
agreement.26
Similarly, in the class action context, the liberal Justices appear
more willing to certify classes in order to allow them to try to prove
their claims. In Behrend the liberal dissent argued that the majority
improvidently reviewed the issue of whether the lower courts can
certify a class without resolving whether evidence probative of
damages is admissible.26' Moreover, Justice Ginsburg argued that
256. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 688 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
257. Even though both the plaintiff and defendant were businesses, the liberal Justices
may have dissented in hopes that their argument would help individual or small business
plaintiffs. A finding of class arbitration in this context could lead to the allowance of class
arbitration when smaller plaintiffs are involved. Perhaps the result in Oxford Health Plans,
discussed supra note 240, portends this argument.
258. Rent-A-Ctr., West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 76 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
259. Id. at 65 (majority opinion).
260. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 278 (Souter, J., dissenting).
261. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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Comcast had waived any such argument by failing to object to the
evidence at issue."' Finally, even on the merits, Ginsburg argued that
the majority was overreaching certification requirements.263 The
liberal Justices' willingness to allow for certification when they believe
the requirements are met was also echoed in Dukes. While agreeing
with the conservative Justices that certification was not correct under
Rule 23(b)(2), the liberal Justices argued that Rule 23(b)(3) was and
should still be potentially available." It is not as if the liberal Justices
have a blanket position to certify classes-they scrutinize the
application of the rules just as the conservatives do."' However, there
is a notable difference in result, as demonstrated by these opinions, that
where a corporate interest will benefit, the conservative Justices are
less likely to support the class action and the liberal Justices are more
likely to do just the opposite.
As for Shady Grove, as discussed in the previous section, the
Justices may have different means to their respective ends. Liberal
Justices like Ginsburg and Breyer may have been willing to concede
some of the breadth and reach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in order to clear the way for innovation in the way states address civil
litigation. The short game would have been to prohibit the state law
because it eliminated class actions in that context. Yet, Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer fought to allow the state law to survive, elevating
their federalism position in the short term. In the long term, however,
those Justices might hope that states will fill the gap in the other
direction."' For example, when it comes to civil litigation, states may
find ways to substantively allow for certain kinds of cases, cases that
are all but effectively thwarted in federal courts. As for the short
game, Justice Sotomayor took the position that would allow the class
action to be filed immediately and preserve a pro-plaintiff result.267 In
spite of these periodic diversions, however, what the liberal Justices
262. Id. at 1436.
263. Id. at 1437.
264. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
265. Id.
266. See Steinman, supra note 161, at 1170-71 (arguing that the text of Rule 23 is
ambiguous enough to "avoid a preemptive clash with [some] state policies regarding class
actions"); Wasserman, supra note 46, at 330 ("But in the long run, plaintiffs are more likely to
benefit from favorable state rules and thus more likely to want state law to apply in federal
court, the position that the more liberal Justices Ginsburg and Breyer urged; looking forward,
therefore, the line-up of the Justices makes ideological sense.").




arguably have in common is their effort to maintain the efficacy of the
class action mechanism, however it might be achieved.
VI. FEDERALISM'S PLACE IN PROCEDURAL CASES
This Article argues that the Justices' respective concerns for
business interests on the one hand and plaintiffs on the other might
lead them to subordinate their traditional federalism positions in
procedural cases. The desire to restrict or expand procedure in order to
serve these interests takes primacy over their otherwise strongly held
federalism positions. Taking a pro-business stance requires the
Justices to restrict procedure, thereby reducing what those Justices
would argue is frivolous litigation. In contrast, a pro-plaintiff stance
requires the Justices to expand procedure in order to arguably increase
access to the courts. In the context of procedural cases, these
competing goals, which are based on the Justices' opposing
perceptions of the civil litigation system, lead them to stray from the
positions they take in traditional federalism cases. In this Subpart, the
Article will begin to chip away at this party bias and consider what the
Court's federalism principles should be in private civil litigation cases.
A. A Fedemlism-ProceduralLawPrescnption
First, the question of how federalism concerns should impact
procedural cases in the context of private civil litigation requires
resolution of a different prerequisite question. That question is:
should federalism concerns even animate these cases in the first place?
Taking a look at private civil litigation, this Article argues the answer is
a qualified yes.268 Private civil litigation provides an important mode
of regulation, and states and their citizens have a strong interest in
accessing that system. Moreover, states want to protect their citizenry
and state laws intended to provide that protection should, to the extent
possible, be actionable. To that end, the Court, when weighing a
procedural question that also places federal and state power in tension,
should consider what the state and federal interests in that litigation
might be.
This consideration should not be determinative, however, hence
the qualified yes. Part of this Article's critique is that federalism is
268. The question of how substantive or constitutional federalism cases should be
resolved is beyond the scope of this Article. In that context, different concerns are at play.
See sources cited supra note 22. This Article's focus is on procedural cases and more
specifically, procedural cases in the private civil litigation context.
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used as a proxy for ideological positioning.269 The Article would fall
victim to the same criticism were it to advocate for a full-throated
states' rights position. Instead, using Edward Rubin and Malcolm
Feeley's summary of the standard arguments in favor of federalism, the
Article begins to sketch out how the Court might think about the
intersection of federalism and private civil litigation.270
In their article, Fedemlism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
Rubin and Feeley pronounced (and critiqued) four standard
justifications for federalism-federalism, in this case, meaning a
deference to the states.2 7  Those principles are "public participation,
effectuating citizen choice through competition among jurisdictions,
achieving economic efficiency through competition among
jurisdictions, and encouraging experimentation."272  The public
participation justification argues that "locating various decisions at the
regional or local level will enable more people to participate in these
decisions."273  Citizen choice is the argument that by decentralizing
government, it will "be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a
heterogeneous society [and will] make[] government more responsive
269. This criticism is well-covered in literature about whether federalism is a
constitutional or prudential value. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 935 (1994) ("[B]ecause
federalism's force is symbolic and not truly normative, it quickly becomes a proxy for more
compelling substantive views that it happens to support."); id at 948 ("[C]laims of federalism
are often nothing more than strategies to advance substantive positions or, alternatively, that
people declare themselves federalists when they oppose national policy, and abandon that
commitment when they favor it."); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s
Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: "The Political Safeguards" of
Aggregate TranslocalActions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929 (2008) (discussing the federalization
of class actions from the 1960s through 2005 and arguing that the "underlying national norms
change, but the method [of federalization] does not").
270. Rubin & Feeley, supm note 269, at 914. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley's
controversial article ultimately rejected these common justifications for constitutional
federalism. Id at 909. They argued that these justifications were not arguments that
supported constitutional federalism, but were instead arguments in favor of decentralization.
Id This Article does not profess to enter this controversial fray. Many scholars have already
done so. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 380-85 (1997)
(discussing Rubin and Feeley's argument regarding the value of federalism); Jackson, supm
note 22, at 2213-22 (same). Even though there is disagreement about which principles
should guide the determination of whether federalism should be a constitutional or prudential
value, the principles Rubin and Feeley marshal are, in some shape or form, accepted as
justifications for federalism and, more importantly, used by the Court.
271. Rubin & Feeley, supm note 269, at 949.
272. Id at 914. As discussed supra note 270 and accompanying text, Rubin and
Feeley's normative justifications for federalism are also met in this context.
273. Id at 915.
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by putting the states in competition for a mobile citizenry."2 74
Similarly, state competition is the "idea ... that jurisdictions will
compete for productive assets ... and desirable people ... by creating
a favorable economic climate."' Finally, the experimentation
argument posits that "federalism gives the states an opportunity to
experiment with different programs."276
Parts III through V of this Article examined a number of
instances where the Court has not adhered to traditional federalism
principles. For example, in the consumer preemption context, state
substantive law was not applied. Those cases generally limited the
states' ability to protect their own citizens.277 In cases like PLIVA and
Bartlet where there was a state law remedy available to a private
citizen, the states had a meaningful interest in seeing those matters
171
adjudicated, yet the Court prevented the states from doing so.
Similarly, there were cases where plaintiffs attempting to get into
relatively plaintiff-friendly state courts were prevented from doing so
or were funneled into relatively hostile federal courts. For instance, in
Concepcion, California's law was disregarded in the face of the FAA.
Like the preemption cases, Concepcion effectively resulted in cutting
off a remedial path for aggrieved individuals because of the Court's
hostility toward class arbitration.27 9
Applying the four justifications articulated by Rubin and Feeley
to these examples demonstrates that, in the run of private civil
litigation cases, the Court should give greater deference to the states.
First, as to public participation, these state laws reflect the localized
274. Id at 917 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
275. Id. at 920.
276. Id. at 923.
277. See, e.g., Michelle L. Caton, Form Over Fairness: How the Supreme Courth
Misreading of the FederalArbitration Act Has Leff Consumers in a Lurch, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REv 497, 518 (2014) (arguing that broad preemption of state law creates a significant
impediment for state legislation aimed at protecting state citizens from resulting drawbacks of
consumer arbitration); Margaret S. Thomas, Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Through the Federalism Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. Pot'Y 187, 259 (2013) (concluding that Shady Grove allows the Court and the Advisory
Committee to dictate the kind of state legislation used to regulate matters that Congress has
historically left to the states' "sphere of competency"); Richard C. Worf, Jr., The Effect of
State Law on the Judge-ury Relationship in Federal Court, 30 N. ILL. U. L. REv 109, 162-163
(2009) (arguing that courts should not hold the Seventh Amendment in conflict with the Efie
Doctrine with respect to state law rights to jury trial in diversity cases, as the Framers' intent
was to avoid any threats made by Article III power to review questions of fact or by
Congress's power to create lower federal courts).
278. See discussion supra Part III.A.
279. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,1753 (2011).
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consciousness that federalism professes to cultivate. Individual
citizens elect local officials to enact these very laws or, in some cases,
elect the judges that will decide these cases. In addition, different state
laws are reflective of a heterogeneous society, and depending on the
degree to which the laws differ, they arguably create competition for a
"mobile citizenry." These variant state laws arguably would create a
more favorable economic climate because competition among states
will drive different people and assets to different states. If one state
adopts a particular substantive regime and another state does not, that
is the exact kind of competition that proponents of traditional
federalism principles want. If those laws are not enforced or otherwise
actionable, however, there will be no competition. Finally, the states
can function as laboratories by experimenting with different legal
standards that might also vary from state to state. This is the kind of
experimentation that federalism is arguably meant to foster.
In sum, all four of the standard justifications for federalism apply
to these cases. Thus, based on these justifications, in a context where
the state has a localized interest in enforcing a particular state law or
where the state court offers a friendly forum to its citizens, federalism
concerns that potentially animate resolution of the procedural issue
should be sensitive to state interests. Again, this deference should not
be determinative, but if federalism is a value that the Justices are
weighing, these criteria suggest that the private civil litigation context
is a valid place to consider a more conservative federalism position.
In addition to the standard justifications articulated above, Rubin
and Feeley also offered two alternative justifications for federalism.280
They argued that federalism is justified as a constitutional principle if
it furthers the "division of political power" and "secure[s] the promise
of liberty."28' Some examples from the cases discussed in this Article
illustrate these alternative criteria as well.
For example, with respect to the division of political power, the
consumer preemption cases demonstrate that federal interests are
complicated at best. While there is strong interest in facilitating the
supremacy of federal law, federal regulatory agencies are quite
resource-strapped. In the face of that, society's dependence on
individuals to bring litigation enforcing the safety of products is
280. As discussed supra note 270, Rubin and Feeley criticized the standard
justifications. A detailed account of that criticism is beyond the scope of this Article. In the
interest of beginning the discussion of how federalism should be treated in private civil
litigation cases, however, their alternative justifications are briefly discussed.
281. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 269, at 949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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paramount.282 In other words, the division of political power is served
by allowing state law to comfortably coexist with federal law. This
means that, on this measure at least, the states' interest in protecting
their own is quite strong and, in this private civil litigation context,
deserves credibility.
The goal of securing the promise of liberty is also met by giving
due consideration to state interests in this context. In private civil
litigation cases, state citizens generally seek relief for alleged injuries
suffered at the hands of foreign-meaning out-of-state--defendants.
Access to state law remedies and/or the state court system is necessary
for the state to fulfill the role of protecting the best interests of its
citizenry. In contrast, the federal government's interest on this count is
far less pronounced. In cases where a state government actor is a
defendant, the federal government's interest is higher because those
cases function as a check on state power and go a long way toward
protecting personal liberty.283 While there might be similar power-
282. See, eg., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1137 (2012) (proposing a framework
that is tailored to support the structural role of private litigation within the public regulatory
regime); Sarah Staszak, Review Essay, Realiang the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the
Amencan State, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 222, 228 (2013) (stressing the pivotal role that
private litigation plays in enforcing policy among multiple industries and revealing the
importance of courts in filling the vacuum left by politicians to control the administrative
state); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of
Adninistrative, Cnminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 971-74 (suggesting that the
tort system is a more flexible form of obtaining relief, avoids agency capture, and is more
effective than regulatory agencies at exposing "bad acts").
283. The dual court system is, of course, a product of the Madisonian Compromise.
Some of the framers wanted lower federal courts specifically because they feared that state
courts would be unfriendly to federal interests. Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power To Control the Jwisdiction ofLower Federal Courts: A Cntical Review
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 53-54 (1975). Others believed that Supreme
Court appellate review of those decisions was enough protection and feared the presence of
federal trial courts in the states. Id The resulting compromise produced Article III, Section
1, which leaves the formation, if any, of lower federal courts to Congress. Id at 47, 54-55.
This distrust is emblematic of the tensions discussed in this Article. In cases where federal
interests are not being enforced by state courts, it is clear why this distrust is at its highest.
See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 60 (1993) (arguing that challenges to states' handling of federal
need-based programs were taken through the federal courts because "state courts were
notoriously hostile to the interests of blacks"); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the
Linits of Supreme Court Authority Williams v. Georgia Revisited 103 YALE L.J. 1423,
1465-79 (1994) (examining southern states' hostility to federal constitutional claims about
racial discrimination); Paul B. Stephan, Redistributive Litigation--Judicial Innovation,
Private Expectations, and the Shadow ofInternational Law, 88 VA. L. REv 789, 872 (2002)
("During both the nineteenth and twentieth centur[ies], the Supreme Court not only engaged
in substantive review of state court decisions that it regarded as hostile to federal interests, but
tweaked the rules governing federal court jurisdiction to make it easier for persons likely to
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checking concerns in the private civil litigation context, they are less
pronounced because the state is not acting as an adjudicator and a
party. The state, at most, acts as an adjudicator. As a result, there is
less opportunity for the state to exceed its authority and harm an
individual citizen.284
What all of this means is that both the traditional and alternative
justifications for federalism generally map onto the private civil
litigation context. Thus, on balance, the Court should endeavor to give
some deference to state power in the private civil litigation context
when deciding procedural issues. This does not mean that the Court
should be led blindly by state laws and state courts, but it should give
their interests due consideration. That consideration may, in some
cases, mean deferring to a state law or allowing a case to proceed in a
state court.
B. OptimalFederalism-ProcedualLaw Baknce In Action
There is at least one procedural area where the Court has more
consistently adhered to traditionally conservative federalism principles
in this context. That area is subject matter jurisdiction. Like all of the
cases discussed in this Article, there is some variance, but on the
whole, the Court is deferential to state court systems by adhering to the
principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Court has done this in spite of its proclivity for siding
with business or plaintiff interests in other procedural cases.
During the period covered by this Article, five subject matter
jurisdiction cases were decided by the Court. Four of the five were
unanimous decisions. Watson v Philip Mornis Cos.,285 Mims v Arrow
Financial Services, LLC"' Smith v Bayer Corp.,28 7 and Gunn v
suffer at the hands of state judges to obtain a federal hearing."). But see Michael E. Solimine
& James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation hi Federal and State Courts: An Empincal
Analysis ofludicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214-15 (1983) ("[S]tate courts are
no more 'hostile' to the vindication of federal rights than are their federal counterparts, and
... the opportunity for review by state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court
significantly mitigates concern over the institutional competence of state trial courts."
(footnote omitted)).
284. And, assuming the state exceeds its authority in adjudicating a claim, the plaintiff
will have recourse through a separate due process claim.
285. 551 U.S. 142 (2007).
286. 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).
287. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (2011). While Bayer was also about class actions, it is
better categorized as a subject matter jurisdiction case because the Court had to determine
whether a federal court has the authority to enjoin a state court action.
360 [Vol. 89:307
CIVIL-IZING FEDERALISM
Mhntod" were unanimous, while Vaden v Discover Bank" was split
five-to-four. In three of the unanimous opinions, Watson, Mims, and
Bayer, the plaintiffs were individuals and the defendants were
corporations, and in all three cases a unanimous court found in favor
of the plaintiffs. This does not mean, however, that the Court took a
significantly limited view of its subject matter jurisdiction.
In Mims, the issue was whether Congress intended for states to
have exclusive jurisdiction over private actions brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA).290 A consumer
brought a claim under the Act against a debt-collection agency.291 He
filed his suit in federal court, arguing that the court had federal
question jurisdiction.292 The district court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and found that the
TCPA's provision stating that a private person could seek remedy under
the Act "in an appropriate court of [a] State," "if [such an action is]
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of [that] State," meant
that the action could only be filed in state court.293 The Court rejected
that reading of the statute and found that unless Congress explicitly
states otherwise, in a federal action created by federal statute, state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.294 Thus, the Court allowed
the case to stay in federal court.
In Watson, the other unanimous opinion with a corporate
defendant, the Court limited its subject matter jurisdiction.295 In that
case, the plaintiffs filed a civil lawsuit in state court against a cigarette
manufacturer alleging state law claims of unfair and deceptive
business practices.296 The defendants attempted to use the federal
officer removal statute297 to argue that because their industry was so
heavily regulated by federal agencies, the suit was one ripe for removal
on that basis.298 The Court rejected this argument and found that
simply "complying" with federal law did not bring private actors under
the federal officer umbrella.299
288. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
289. 556 U.S. 49 (2009).
290. 132 S. Ct. at 744.
291. Id
292. Id.
293. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
294. Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 745.
295. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 145 (2007).
296. Id. at 146.
297. 28 US.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2012).
298. Watson, 551 U.S. at 146.
299. Id at 152.
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Bayer allowed a state court to move forward with its class action
adjudication even in the face of a contrary federal court decision."oo In
that case, two similar class action cases were filed-one ended up in
federal court and one stayed in state court. The federal court declined
to certify the class and attempted to enjoin the state court from
separately certifying a similar class in its case."o' Justice Kagan wrote
a unanimous opinion and explained that the West Virginia Supreme
Court had "declar[ed] its independence from federal courts'
interpretation of the Federal Rules-and particularly of Rule 23,"
meaning that the state court's resolution of class certification was
different from the federal court's resolution of the same.302 More
specifically, the state's supreme court had distinguished its Rule
23(b)(3) predominance inquiry from the federal standard. 3  This,
according to the Court, meant that the relitigation exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act should not apply in this case, and the state court
should be free to decide for itself whether to certify the class or not."
The final unanimous opinion, Gunn, involved a malpractice suit
by an individual against his attorney.0 . The plaintiff argued that his
state law malpractice claim should be subject to federal question
jurisdiction because an issue of patent law had to be resolved in order
to resolve the malpractice claim.0 ' The Court disagreed, finding that
even though Congress had reserved patent litigation exclusively to the
federal courts, it did not intend for the courts' subject matter
jurisdiction to be so expansive as to include a state malpractice claim
that happened to raise an issue of patent law.30 ' The federal issue was
simply not substantial enough to justify such capacious jurisdiction.300
The only subject matter opinion that was divided was Vaden. In
that case, the corporate credit card company sought past-due charges
from one of its credit card holders.309 It filed its complaint in state
court because the claim was based on state law and the parties did not
300. The Court spoke with one voice, but because Justice Kagan was the authoring
Justice, this Article attributes much of the federalism discussion to her.
301. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373-74 (2011).
302. Id at 2377-78.
303. Id. at 2378.
304. Id. In addition, the Court rejected Bayer's argument that the plaintiff in the state
court case was bound as a potential class member in the federal case. Id. at 2379.
305. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1063 (2013).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1066-67.
308. Id
309. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 (2009).
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meet the diversity requirements."'o The defendant counterclaimed,
alleging that the company's charges and interest violated state law.31 '
The plaintiff invoked its arbitration clause from its cardholder
agreement and petitioned a federal district court to compel
arbitration.'" The Court's majority-Justices Ginsburg, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas-determined that the federal court did
not have jurisdiction over that part of the entire action on the basis of a
federal counterclaim.'13  In order for the federal court to assert
jurisdiction on the basis of the FAA, the whole action had to meet the
requirements of federal question jurisdiction.314 The Court argued, "[I]t
makes scant sense to allow one of the parties to enlist a federal court to
disturb the state-court proceedings by carving out issues for separate
resolution. ""'
The dissent in Vaden, however, argued that because the specific
claim was subject to the FAA, the Court should not be concerned with
whether the underlying action itself is subject to federal question
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Alito did not dispute the premise that federal question jurisdiction is
limited and generally only attaches when the federal issue is well-
pled."' Yet, because the specific issue raised, even as a counterclaim,
was subject to an arbitration agreement, it should still be subject to the
FAA because it reaches controversies even when embedded in a state
law claim.' The dissent more broadly articulated distrust of state
courts and reservations about the civil litigation system. The Justices
argued that while they agreed with the majority that the state courts
have a duty to follow the law with respect to the arbitration agreement,
the FAA provides a federal remedy that should be respected. It stated,
"We do not, however, narrowly construe the federal remedies-say,
federal antitrust or civil rights remedies-because state law provides
remedies in those areas as well."' As for the civil litigation system,
the dissent stated, "A big part of arbitration is avoiding the procedural




313. Id. at 54.
314. Id at 69.
315. Id





court to compel arbitration hinge on just such niceties in a pending
case." 319
What these cases demonstrate is that, in general, the Court has
recently taken a more conservative approach to federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Moreover, the cases show that the Justices are not guided
as strongly by their interests in protecting particular parties. Gunn,
Watson, and Bayertook a traditional conservative federalism approach
by finding that the federal court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction. Watson and Bayerpitted an individual against a corpora-
tion, yet the Court was unanimous in its decision against the
corporation.32 Gunn involved two private litigants, but that decision is
critical for its respect of the states' interest in regulating lawyers. As
for Mins, the Court arguably expanded federal subject matter
jurisdiction, although the better argument is that it maintained the
default of concurrent jurisdiction and affirmed that Congress had the
authority to explicitly provide otherwise in its legislation. Key to
Mhns, however, is the fact that the unanimous Court decided a case in
favor of an individual and against a corporation.
The final case, Vaden, took a limited position on federal subject
matter jurisdiction, but it also critically split the traditional factions,
with Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Kennedy joining traditionally
conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas in the majority, and Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joining traditionally liberal Justices
Breyer and Stevens. An opinion like Vaden reflects a departure from
many of the split cases discussed in this Article because the traditional
factions part ways.32 Together, these cases demonstrate that the Court
is staying closer to a model of limited federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Consequently, any particular bias toward business or
plaintiffs is less pronounced. In other words, the civil litigation
narratives discussed in Parts III through V seem to have less currency.
319. Id. at 76.
320. The holding in Bayer can be overstated in this regard, however. It is true that the
Court was unanimous in allowing a state court to continue with its class certification
decision; thus, this case seems to be a traditional conservative federalism case and, moreover,
appears to be less hostile to class action cases than is the Court's norm. See supra notes 241-
246 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's class action jurisprudence. Yet,
this case was decided after CAFA was adopted. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381-
82 (2011). The Court understood that in the future, the state court class action in Bayer
would be removable to federal court under CAFA. Id. at 2382. Thus, Bayeris a case that has
limited application, and it therefore has less to say about the Justices' proclivity for siding
with business interests in the context of a case that presents federalism concerns.
321. While there were certainly factional departures in the cases discussed in Parts III
through V they were the exception, not the rule. See discussion supra Parts VA.2, VB.2.
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A response might be that the Court is more sensitive to
federalism in this context because Article III of the Constitution
created a dual court system where the federal courts would play a
limited role.3 2 Thus, it makes sense that in federal subject matter
jurisdiction cases, conservative federalism principles would prevail-
the Constitution requires as much. In the other cases discussed in this
Article, however, it is not Article III, but federal statutory law,' the
Supremacy Clause,324 and due process3 25 concerns at play. In those
latter cases, the federal government is not limited and is, in fact, more
concerned with enforcing its law.
It is true that in each specific case, Article III concerns are not
explicitly at issue. Yet, the policy behind a dual court system is still
paramount. As discussed in Part VI.A above, applying the standard
and alternative justifications for federalism to these kinds of cases
demonstrates that the federal government's interest in this litigation is
lower. In that sense, all of the cases discussed in this Article implicate
the federalism concerns readily apparent in subject matter jurisdiction
cases.
The overarching issue is whether the state laws and the state court
system are available to state citizens. In most of the cases discussed in
this Article, the conservative faction has generally prohibited
application of state law, kept cases out of the state forum altogether, Or
placed the cases in an arguably more hostile federal forum. Yet,
deference to the state system is not only a more appropriate approach
as a matter of access to civil justice, it is also a more appropriate
response as a matter of federalism. To the extent the two collide-
procedure and federalism-the Court's approach in subject matter
jurisdiction cases stands as a ready example of how the Court might
weigh federalism in the private civil litigation context.
322. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
323. The FAA, for example, is statutory.
324. The preemption cases implicate the Supremacy Clause. Gade v. Nat'1 Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (stating that the preemption doctrine is derived
from the Supremacy Clause).
325. The Fourteenth Amendment is at issue in personal jurisdiction cases. Int'l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[N]ow that the capias adrespondendum has
given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment Ma pesonam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' (citation
omitted)).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Traditional conservative and liberal approaches to federalism
tend to prevail in contentious cases where substantive claims are at
stake. Yet, in the procedural context, where federalism concerns also
loom, the Court does not divide along these predictable lines. These
federalist diversions are due, at least in part, to the Justices' inclination
to protect certain parties' interests: conservatives want to protect
business interests and liberals want to protect plaintiffs' access to the
civil justice system. Yet, in private civil litigation, a place where the
state has a strong interest in protecting its citizenry, the Court's
federalism principles should be more traditionally conservative. In
short, a more "civil-ized" form of federalism might be more attentive
to state interests.
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APPENDIX
Roberts Court Procedural Cases in Consumer Preemption,
Arbitration, Class Action, Personal Jurisdiction, and
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Categories...
SUBJECT
CONSUMER CLASS PERSONAL MATTER





2007- Atria Grp., Hall St. Watson v
08 Inc. v Assocs., Phip
Gooa4 555 L.L.C. v. Mois Cos.,
U.S. 70 Mattel, Inc., Inc., 551
(2008); 552 U.S. 576 U.S. 142
Riegel v (2008); (2007).
Medtronic, Preston v.
Inc., 552 Ferrer, 552
U.S. 312 U.S. 346
(2008). (2008).
2008- W5ett v 14 Penn Plaza Vaden v
09 Levine, 555 LLC v. Pyett, Discover
U.S. 555 556 U.S. 247 -- -- Bag 556
(2009). (2009). U.S.49
(2009).
2009- Stolt-Nielsen Shady Grove
10 S.A.v. Orthopedic
AnimalFeeds Assocs., PA.
Int'l Corp., v Alstate,
559 U.S. 662 559 U.S. 393






326. Procedural cases implicating federalism are in italics.
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SUBJECT
CONSUMER CLASS PERSONAL MATTER
PREEMPTION ARBITRATION AcTION JURISDICTION JURISDICTION
2010- Bruesewmtz AT&T Erica P John Goodyear Smith v
11 v Wyeth Mobility Fund, Inc. v. Dunlop Tires Bayer Corp.,
LLC 131 S. LLC v Halliburton, Operations 131 S. Ct.
Ct. 1068 Concepdion, 131 S. Ct. S.A. v. 2368 (2011).
(2011); 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); Brown, 131
PLIVA, Inc. 1740 (2011). Wal-Mart S. Ct. 2846
v Menshg, Stores, Inc. v. (2011); J
131 S. Ct. Dukes, 131 S. McIntyr
2567 Ct. 2541 Mach. Ltd v
(2011); (2011). Nicastro, 131






2011- Marmet Mns v
12 Health Care ArrowFrn.
Ctr., Inc. v. Servs., LLC,
Brown, 132 S. 132 S. Ct.
Ct. 1201 740 (2012).
(2012).
2012- Mut. Oxford Health Amgen Inc. v. Gunn v
13 Pharm. Co. Care Plans Conn. Ret. Minton, 133
v Barlett LLC v. Sutter, Plans & Trust S. Ct. 1059
133 S. Ct. 133 S. Ct. Funds, 133 S. (2013).
2466 2064(2013); Ct. 1184
(2013). Am. Exp. Co. (2013);
v. Italian Comcast
Colors Rest., Corp. v. --
133 S. Ct. Behrend, 133




133 S. Ct. 500
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